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Abstract

According to recent statistics provided by the National Institute of Mental Health (2013),
American women are twice as likely as men to face diagnosis with an anxiety disorder. While
there are existing bodies of sociological and feminist work theorizing both the social
construction of mental illness categories and the historical pathologization of women, there is no
contemporary dialogue centered on gendered disparity in anxiety diagnosis rates. In this paper, I
contribute to ongoing discussion of neoliberal influence on the gendering of mental illness
through an exploration of the forces contributing to disparity in rates of diagnosis with anxiety
disorders. In response to themes brought to light while analyzing survey data provided by 69
college students, my work focuses on the influence personal experience has on perception,
contradictions between the biological and the social, and constructions of masculinity. I conclude
by arguing the necessity of an American mental health justice movement that recognizes the
neoliberal state, rather than the individual, as the primary site of anxiety production.
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Chapter One

Gendered Disparity in Diagnosis
According to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), “anxiety disorders affect
about 40 million American adults ages 18 and older (about 18%) in a given year, causing them to
be filled with fearfulness and uncertainty” (2014). These diagnoses are not only rampant; they
are disproportionately distributed throughout the American population. The fifth edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-V) reports that American women are more than twice as likely as American men to be
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (2013:223). Research by NIMH and the Anxiety and
Depression Association of America (ADAA) confirms this statistic: NIMH reports that “women
are 60% more likely than men to experience an anxiety disorder over their lifetime” (2014).
Prominent mental health authorities are unanimous in their assertion that American women are
more than twice as likely to experience anxiety disorders by nature of their sex. How have
American women come to be doubly susceptible to categorization as pathologically anxious?
The authoritative voices of dominant mental health institutions have created a cultural
understanding that certain emotions, when experienced in excess or particular combinations, call
for medical diagnosis and treatment. Yet, there are psychiatrists and social theorists—Thomas
Szasz, Michel Foucault, and Robert Merton among them—who have argued that mental illness is
not a natural phenomenon that was discovered by neurologists, biologists, and geneticists; rather,
they suggest that it is a social construct, finding its genesis within particular social contexts
1

during particular moments in history. These scholars have asked how society, not biology, has
determined who is mentally ill and who is not. They have highlighted the gray areas and blank
spaces in psychiatric diagnostic criteria and biological research as evidence that mental disorders
are interpretive, subjective, and socially defined. Epidemic rates of diagnosis with anxiety
disorders suggest that now is the time for sociologists to re-investigate the role played by society
in producing mental illness. The statistics demand that the epidemic rates of anxiety diagnoses
and the gendered disparity within those diagnoses be thoroughly and critically examined through
both a sociological and a feminist lens. The question I seek to answer through my thesis is this:
how has the social construction of anxiety contributed to American women’s disproportionate
susceptibility to diagnosis?

Anxiety as an Umbrella Term
I began this project with an eye to specificity. The statistical sociologist in me–the one
who has been trained to examine one specific independent variable X in relation to one specific
dependent variable Y–believed that the most empirical way to answer my research question was
to choose a single diagnostic category to serve as my dependent variable. However, as my
familiarity with the history of American psychiatry has grown, I have observed how rigid and
confining the symptomatology of discrete diagnostic categories can be. I now feel that focusing
on just one disorder would make me compliant with the system I am critically examining.
As I elaborate in the coming chapters, the use of discrete diagnostic categories multiplies
the need for psychiatric and psychopharmaceutical niches to accommodate them. It further
medicalizes, pathologizes, and pigeonholes the gamut of human expression and emotion that
falls under the “anxiety” umbrella. It perpetuates the neoliberal principles of individualization
and isolation. This is why, rather than conduct a study examining just Generalized Anxiety
2

Disorder or Panic Disorder or any other of the multiple forms of anxiety disorders, I have chosen
to instead use “anxiety disorder” as an umbrella term. In no way does my decision to treat
anxiety disorders as a homogenous group of diagnostic categories mean to essentialize the
experiences of those who have received diagnoses. Rather, my goal is to problematize the social
climate in which these disorders are produced, diagnosed, and treated.

Positionality of the Researcher
With a project as controversial as this, it is imperative that I address my personal reasons
for choosing to pursue this research. As is the case for most things we become passionate about,
my decision to focus on women and anxiety disorders stems from personal experience. My
mother’s lifelong battle with mental illness and the consequent social and economic obstacles
she has faced have continually motivated me throughout the research process. While anxiety and
depression have been her greatest struggles, my mother has been clinically diagnosed with four
disorders over the past 17 years. Each doctor’s appointment left her with a new diagnosis, and
each prescription left her with a new range of symptoms (and expenses) that she had not
anticipated. I have always wondered whether my mother’s self-identification and coping
strategies would have taken a more positive trajectory had her emotional struggles not been
pathologized and medicated in the ways that they had.
In addition to my mother’s history, my own, albeit brief, encounter with diagnosis has
also contributed to my interest in pursuing this project. After expressing moderate academic and
social anxieties at an annual doctor’s appointment when I was sixteen, my physician determined
that my emotions mirrored symptoms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. I was promptly offered a
prescription of “take as needed” anti-anxiety medication until I could get in to see a psychiatrist
and receive a proper diagnosis. I rejected the prescription and the psychiatric visit. I was
3

unwilling to resign myself to the same dependency on medication my mother was trapped in, and
I was terrified that what I had been feeling might be a biological, genetic illness rather than a
normal response to the stresses of high school. That doctor’s visit stuck with me and caused me
to question the legitimacy of a diagnostic process so quick to diagnose and pharmaceutically
treat.
Because of the intimately personal connection I have to my research, I entered into this
project with a bias that, for transparency’s sake, should be brought to light. Because of my
experiences with my mother, I believed at the onset of my research that anxiety disorders are not
biologically derived, but socially produced. Although I do not find this presupposition to be
entirely problematic, I think it is important for me to take into consideration what feminist
scholar Kath Weston writes about “making the familiar strange” when studying a culture one is
already a part of (2004:201). Weston writes that “presumptions of a common frame of reference
and shared identity can…complicate the [researcher’s] task by leaving cultural notions implicit,
making her work to get people to state, explain, and situate the obvious” (2004:202). In the
process of writing this thesis, particularly when conducting my analysis, I have made certain that
a multiplicity of perspectives have been offered in my writing. It would be counterproductive for
my personal experience to allow me to dismiss other perspectives, even if what I encounter
contradicts what I have learned through my own experience.
In addition to recognizing the bias that accompanies my personal experience, I have
remained conscientious of my general positionality as a white woman with access to educational
and economic privileges. As both sociologists and feminists have long argued, the position of
researcher is inherently imbedded with privilege and power; even the sociological knowledge
that there is such a thing as a social constructionist perspective towards mental illness creates a
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particular power dynamic between myself and participants in my survey (see Sprague 2005 and
Stoppard 2000). However, as Scott Lauria Morgensen points out, “even feminist work never
entirely resolves the problem of power embedded in research” (2013:70). Acknowledging my
situated power as a researcher should not prevent me from taking on important and meaningful
projects, but should help keep me from inadvertently reinforcing uneven power relationships.

Overview of Thesis
As previously stated, this thesis explores through an interdisciplinary perspective how the
social construction and production of anxiety disorders has contributed to gendered disparity in
current rates of diagnosis. In the next chapter, “The Social Construction of Anxiety Disorders,” I
will provide a history of the psychiatric evolution of mental illness, followed by a brief analysis
of the categories of anxiety disorders presented in the recently published DSM-V. This will lead
into a discussion of the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s and the influence this movement
had in inspiring the emergence of a sociology of mental illness. I conclude the chapter by setting
up the theoretical framework I later use to inform my analysis and discussion. Chapter Three,
“The Pathologization of Women,” explores the historical pathologization of women through a
review of literature that engages psychological justifications, feminist theoretical perspectives,
and previous research.
I begin Chapter Four, “A Feminist Methodology,” with a discussion of the obstacles I
faced in getting my research methods approved by the College of Wooster’s Human Subjects
Review Committee. The latter portion of the chapter then details the development of the survey
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on exposure to and attitudes towards anxiety disorders I constructed to collect my data, as well as
the process by which I completed my analysis. I conclude the chapter with a brief demographic
snapshot of my sample. Chapter Five, “Normalizing Abnormality,” highlights the three dominant
themes that emerged from participant survey responses: exposure to anxiety disorders through
interpersonal experience; contradictory beliefs about the origins of anxiety disorders; and
masculinity as the supposed cause of gendered disparity in diagnosis rates. I situate the results of
my data within the context of the theoretical framework set up in Chapter Two and the literature
reviewed in Chapter Three. Additionally, I illuminate places where my data raises new,
unanswered questions that could be used as fodder for future research.
I conclude my thesis by articulating how my research can be used in praxis in Chapter
Six, “Movement Towards Mental Health Justice.” Feminist scholars Toby Jayaratne and Abigail
Stewart state that “when selecting a research topic or problem, we should ask how that research
has potential to help women’s lives” (2008:54). In solidarity with Jayartne’s and Stewart’s
philosophy, it is my hope that this project problematizes mainstream understandings of how
anxiety disorders are developed, diagnosed, and treated. Chapter Six parses the politics behind
social justice activism taking place in a neoliberal context and attempts to identify how the
knowledge produced by this study can be used to inspire activism for mental health justice. I
conclude that beginning to understand anxiety disorders as phenomena greatly influenced by
social structures could play an important role in restructuring the ways we treat and respond to
those who experience them.
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Chapter Two

The Social Construction of Anxiety Disorders
Since all systems of classification are made by people, it is necessary to be aware of who has
made the rules and for what purpose.
—Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness

At the outset of this chapter on the social construction of anxiety, I want to make it
explicitly clear that my intention in applying a social constructionist perspective to the concept of
mental illness is not to challenge the “realness” of the experiences of those living with diagnoses.
Nor is it to disprove biological and neurological evidence that natural causes are indeed the
foundation of certain mental diseases, or deny suggested correlations between neurotransmitters,
genetics, and anxiety disorders. Rather, my goal is to dissect the social origins of the system of
classification being used to medically diagnose anxiety through a synthesis of past work that has
attempted to do the same. Many systems of classification have come to be understood as
products of social construction: gender, race, and class among them. Yet this understanding does
not invalidate the reality of what it means to live as a Black woman, as a Hispanic man, as
working class. My objective is to uncover socially constructed elements masquerading as
naturally occurring phenomena within the diagnostic framework, not the individual experiences
deriving from that framework.
That being said, the goal of this chapter is to establish a social constructionist context
within which I can comfortably situate the rest of my work. It will begin with a historical
overview of the psychiatric field and the development of the concept of mental illness, followed
by current definitions of mental illness and the most common categories of anxiety disorders
7

deriving from the recently published fifth edition of the DSM. After setting up a psychiatric
frame of reference, the chapter will conclude with an in-depth exploration of both classical and
contemporary social theories of mental illness.
This theoretical exploration will provide a synopsis of the work of Thomas Szasz and
Michel Foucault, whose radical social constructionist stances on mental illness largely inspired
the anti-psychiatry movement that occurred during the 1960s. Although the writing of Szasz and
Foucault establishes a general social constructionist stance on mental illness, two additional
theoretical perspectives have taken root within the discipline: structural strain theory and
labeling, or societal reaction, theory. While classical structural strain theory in the vein of Robert
Merton “locates the origins of disorder and distress in the broader organization of society [i.e.,
that structural inequities lead some populations to being more susceptible to diagnosis with
mental illness than others,]” “the logic behind labeling theory is that people who are labeled as
mentally ill, and who are treated as mentally ill, become mentally ill” (Thoits 2010:106). This
chapter will explicate each of these sociological perspectives, examining structural strain theory
as developed by Merton and labeling theory as developed by Thomas Scheff. Sociologist Peggy
Thoits’ contemporary interpretation of these theories specifically as they pertain to mental illness
will be used as an additional guide. The chapter will close with a look at two contemporary
counterparts to structural strain and labeling theory, whose recent interpretation and applications
are relevant to the current state of psychiatry and diagnostics and are salient to this work: Thoits’
contemporary variation on labeling theory, “self-labeling theory,” and Allan Horwitz’ book on
the social construction of mental illness, Creating Mental Illness.
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The Evolution of Psychiatry and the Concept of “Mental Illness”
The concept of mental illness was first applied to varying forms of psychosis by
neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot in the late 1800s. Until the turn of the 20th century, psychiatric
practice and the categorization of “mentally ill” were relegated to cases of insanity within the
asylum. Then, at a turning point in psychiatric history, psychologist Sigmund Freud
“transformed [the boundary…between the insane and others] by creating a new class of neurotic
behaviors,” becoming the first to use the moniker of mental illness to classify a wide range of
emotional and behavioral expression (Horwitz 2002:53; Szasz 1961:41). Freud determined that
“the differences separating normal from abnormal behavior were only matters of degree, not
kind” (Horwitz 2002:41). He admitted that his determinations were theoretically founded and
were not steeped in empirical scientific discovery; within his texts, Freud advocated for a
psychology, rather than a biological science, of what he saw as “abnormal” human behavior.
However, Freud’s utilization of the word “illness” to categorize particular levels of severity in
neuroses conflated psychology with the medicalized psychiatry already being practiced in
asylums. The two became inextricable from one another, and Freud’s categorizations were
adopted into the psychiatric domain (Szasz 1961:41, Horwitz 2002:45).
The model of psychiatry that emerged from Freudian thought was one in which “the basic
principle…was to link neurotic with normal behavior and to classify both as variants of common
development processes…[it] blurred the distinction between the normal and the neurotic but kept
the distinction between the psychotic and all other behaviors” (Horwitz 2002:41). This model
became known as dynamic psychiatry, and with its inception came the publication of the first
edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
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Mental Disorders (DSM-I) in 1952, which introduced the first formalized definition of mental
illness (APA 1952).
Dynamic psychiatry was the dominant psychiatric practice between 1920 and 1970 and
shaped the content of the DSM-I and DSM-II (Horwitz 2002:58). It was not until 1980 that the
publication of the third Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders birthed modern
diagnostic psychiatry. As such, the system of classification being used today to categorize all that
is termed “mental illness,” “mental disorder,” or “mental disease” is relatively young. Diagnostic
psychiatry did not emerge gradually; rather, the restructuring of mental illnesses into discrete
diagnostic categories constituted a “total reorientation of the discipline over a short period of
time” (Horwitz 2002:54). The rapid formation of this discrete system of categorization served
two functions: one, to discredit the work of anti-psychiatrists and social theorists who were
beginning to question the proposed biological nature of mental illness; and two, to maintain
psychiatric legitimacy in the face of an evolving biomedical landscape that said “real” disorders
have discrete boundaries, are linked to specific underlying etiologies, and can be treated through
physical means (Horwitz 2002:59). The DSM-III was greatly successful in achieving these
functions, concretely framing the symptomatology of mental disorders in the same way as
illnesses and diseases of the body (Horwitz 2002:58, APA 1980). Each edition since has
maintained this diagnostic model, including the recently published DSM-V.

DSM-V Diagnostic Criteria for Anxiety Disorders
As Horwitz argues, “the DSM claims to be based on science rather than ideology, on
medicine rather than anecdote, and on fact rather than unproven and vague entities. For its
advocates, who now include virtually the entire psychiatric community, the illness categories of
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the DSM provide a more accurate and valid description of clinical reality” (2002:81). The start of
my research conveniently coincided with the much anticipated publication of the fifth edition of
the DSM in May of 2013, the first major edition to come out since 1994. The DSM-V was put
together by a collective of thirteen work groups under the direction of the “DSM-5 Task Force,”
comprised of mental health “experts” from various fields. In Creating Mental Illness, Horwitz
posits that “although diagnostic psychiatry is officially agnostic about the variety of factors that
lead people to develop mental diseases, the medicalized system of classification it uses
emphasizes underlying organic pathologies” (2002:3). With a nearly twenty year gap existing
between the publication of the DSM-IV and the DSM-V, I was curious to see if scientific
progress over the past two decades would render the diagnostic criteria for anxiety disorders
biologically founded and testable. Interestingly, questions about the legitimacy of a medicalized
psychiatric field, similar to those posed by Horwitz, are raised by the DSM-V itself. The
introduction states: “it has been well recognized by both the APA and the broad scientific
community working on mental disorders that past science was not mature enough to yield fully
validated diagnoses—that is, to provide consistent, strong, and objective scientific validators of
individual DSM disorders” (APA 2013:5). When an opening statement admits to multiple flaws
in the current diagnostic process (and therefore the potential invalidity of diagnoses made within
it), one would expect affirmation that the revised diagnostic criteria in the DSM-V have now
become the “consistent, strong, and objective scientific validators” that the APA itself
determined were lacking.
However, the introduction then states that “a complete description of the underlying
pathological processes is not possible for most mental disorders,” therefore, “it is important to
emphasize that the current diagnostic criteria are the best available description of how mental
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disorders are expressed and can be recognized by trained clinicians” (2013:xli). It seems that the
DSM-V would agree with Horwitz when he states that “the ascendant belief that ‘mental
illnesses are brain diseases’ is due far more to the cultural belief that only biologically based
illnesses are ‘real’ illnesses than to any empirical findings that the causes of mental disorder are
brain based” (2002:156). Yet even in the face of these assertions by the DSM-V, the definition of
mental disorder given is, word for word, the same that was used in the previous edition. The
DSM definition of mental disorder is as follows:
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning.
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social,
occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or culturally approved response
to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder.
Socially deviant behavior (e.g. political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are
primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance
or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above. (APA
2013:15)
In addition to an unchanged definition of mental disorder, the diagnostic criteria for the
major categories of anxiety disorders were transferred nearly verbatim from the DSM-IV to the
DSM-V (1994:432; 2013:222). The primary diagnostic criteria in the DSM-V for a diagnosis
with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is “excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive
expectation), occurring more days than not for at least 6 months, about a number of events or
activities” (2013:222). Other disorder categories, such as Social Anxiety Disorder and
Agoraphobia, use the same criteria, but replace “about a number of events or activities” with a
specific fear (i.e., social situations, being outside of the home alone) (2013:199, 210). What
constitutes “excessive” anxiety in all cases is left up to the clinician’s judgment, leaving ample
room for individualized interpretation (2013:189). To receive a diagnosis with any anxiety
disorder, the person’s anxiety must not be indicative of another disorder, and “the anxiety, worry,
12

or physical symptoms must cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning” (2013:222).
Statements made within the DSM-V text are strikingly similar to Horwitz’ critiques of
diagnostic psychiatry, one of which states that “rates of the most prevalent disorders—
depression, generalized anxiety, and substance abuse—all vary widely across social contexts”
(Horwitz 2002:180). The diagnostic section for most anxiety disorders in the DSM-V includes a
section entitled “Culture-Related Diagnostic Issues,” containing acknowledgements that certain
populations are more prone to experiencing these disorders than others. For instance, the section
on GAD states that “individuals of European descent tend to experience GAD more frequently
than do individuals of Non-European descent. Furthermore, individuals from developed
countries are more likely than individuals from non-developed countries to report that they have
experience symptoms that meet criteria for GAD in their lifetime” (DSM-V 2013:223). Crucial
to this study, a section entitled “Gender Differences” also exists for nearly every anxiety
disorder, and generally contains a statement about women’s susceptibility to diagnosis. The
sections on GAD, Phobias and Agoraphobia all specifically state that females are twice as likely
as males to be diagnosed, while sections on Social Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder and
Separation Anxiety Disorder allow that the disorder is more common in females than males
(2013:192, 199, 204, 210, 219, 223).
These sorts of socialized patterns in diagnosis, in combination with the evident
discrepancy between the actual construction of DSM-V diagnostic criterion and its supposed
biological nature, are evidence that psychiatry is not immune to sociological critique. Before
detailing the social theories that are most pertinent to an exploration of the current diagnostic
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criteria for anxiety disorders, this chapter will provide a historical overview of the first major
social constructionist stances towards mental illness.

The Myth of Mental Illness & Psychiatric Power
In 1961, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz published a scathing critique of the psychiatric and
biomedical definition of “mental illness” in his book The Myth of Mental Illness. This book, as
well as the larger anti-psychiatry movement that accompanied it, took what was arguably the
pioneering social constructionist stance towards mental illness. Szasz, along with other
prominent thinkers such as Michel Foucault, challenged the pathologization of emotion and the
medicalization of psychiatric practice by shedding light on the psychosocial and ethical factors
governing the diagnostic process. In The Myth of Mental Illness, Szasz states that “general
medicine…never had to ask itself what disease is. It always knew what it meant to be ill, for both
the patient and the doctor knew what pain and other forms of suffering were. Psychiatry never
had such a clear criterion of illness” (Szasz 1961:34). This he attributes to a large conceptual
misappropriation on the part of psychiatry. Objective medical science, he asserts, is the study of
natural disease objects through the testing of their representations. Subjective psychiatric
medicine, on the other hand, reverses this process: it mistakenly studies and classifies
representations in an attempt to locate a natural “object.” In Szasz’s view, this is the grand failure
of psychiatry as a discipline: “since he [the psychoanalyst] has failed to codify this logical
distinction [between object and representation] clearly he will persist in describing his
observations, and in theorizing about them, as though they were objects instead of
representations” (Szasz 1961:51). This object/representation distinction is not meant to challenge
altogether the existence of mental illness; he states that “representations are no less real, of
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course, than real objects” (Szasz 1961:51). What it is meant to challenge is the notion that these
representations are derived from real, naturally occurring objects. His thesis boldly states that
“mental illness is a myth. Psychiatrists are not concerned with mental illnesses and their
treatments. In actual practice they deal with personal, social, and ethical problems in living”
(Szasz 1961:296). Throughout his text, Szasz describes mental illness as a cultural
protolanguage; that is, a mode of human expression among many other alternate modes (Szasz
1961:1). The only thing Szasz believes differentiates this protolanguage from other modes of
expression is that it deals with behaviors and emotions that violate society’s normative roles and
rules.
Over a decade after the publication of The Myth of Mental Illness, Foucault’s “Psychiatric
Power” course from 1973-1974 at Le College de France reignited the anti-psychiatry rhetoric
that Szasz initially incited. In the course description, Foucault states that the only way the
psychiatric field could transfer the power it established in the asylum to the emerging practices
of psychoanalysis and psychopharmacology was through a thorough medicalization of all forms
of mental pathology (Foucault 1994:49). The scientific authority that was given to doctors of the
body had to be transferred to doctors of the mind for the field to progress. “The doctor is
qualified, the doctor knows the diseases and the patients, he possesses a scientific knowledge that
is of the same type as that of the chemist or the biologist, and that is what authorizes him to
intervene and decide. So the power…[given] to the psychiatrist will have to justify itself by
producing phenomena that can be integrated into medical science” (Foucault 1994:44). However,
because scientific research had not discovered any determinant biological causes of mental
illness, psychiatry had to find a way to make sure that “the moment of testing, when the illness
appears in its truth and is fully expressed, no longer must figure in the medical process”
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(Foucault 1994:46). Both Szasz and Foucault believed this was done by overemphasizing
“psychogenic factors in so-called mental illness” and subsequently obscuring psychosocial
factors from view (Szasz 1961:36).
Szasz and Foucault were both informed by and informants of the predominant theoretical
models used by social scientists to explain mental illness, as well as other forms of societal
deviance and role-adaptation. Traces of both structural strain theory, as set up by Robert Merton
in his 1938 work “Social Structure and Anomie,” and Thomas Scheff’s use of labeling theory in
his work Being Mentally Ill, are evident in their writing. “Rule-breaking” (strain theory) and
“role-playing” (labeling) are central tenets of both Szasz’s and Foucault’s perspective (Szasz
1961, Foucault 1994).

Structural Strain Theory
In “Social Structure and Anomie,” Merton outlines a theoretical perspective in which
societal norms, as well as deviance from said norms, are governed by two primary constructs:
cultural goals and institutionalized means (1938:676). Whether or not an individual’s behavior
conforms or deviates from a particular society’s understood set of norms, Merton claims, fully
depends upon the individual’s access to those institutionalized means and subsequent
achievement of those cultural goals. While “conformity to both cultural goals and means is the
most common and widely diffused” adaptation pattern in every society, there are various ways in
which nonconformity, or deviance, can emerge (1938:677). When an individual lacks societally
sanctioned goals, means, or both, they enter into a state of “anomie,” a Durkheimian term
Merton re-appropriates to “describe the gap between cultural goals and the structural means to
those goals” (Thoits 2010:114). This sense of anomie leads the individual to seek out alternative

16

forms of cultural adaptation outside of the typical conformist route. He provides the categories of
innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion as four basic ways in which deviance can
manifest itself (Merton 1938:676). When structural strain theory is used to explain the derivation
of mental illness, retreatism is the category most heavily drawn upon.
Merton states that “persons who ‘adjust’ in…[retreatist] fashion are, strictly speaking, in
the society but not of it” (1938:677). After being denied access to the institutionalized means
necessary to progress and abandoning pursuit of culturally established goals, retreatists are those
that choose to “’escape’ from the requirements of the society” by adopting deviant personas, a
“psychopathological,” or mentally ill, personality being one of those (Merton 1938:678). Merton
and other structural strain theorists believe that retreatism in the form of “mental illness is an
adaptive response to structural strain” (Thoits 2010:115). Contemporary theorists such as Thoits
have applied Merton’s explication of the retreatist response to structural inequality to mental
illness even more directly than Merton himself. Thoits states that “mental illness is not randomly
distributed in society; it is concentrated in several demographic groups that are socially and
economically disadvantaged or low in power and influence,” further supporting Merton’s claim
that mental illness is a product of adverse social circumstances (2010:119). Thoits also places
great importance on roles in her interpretation of structural strain theory, something that Merton
does not directly address. She says that “people who have few or no social roles are at a greater
risk of engaging in deviant behavior” than those with multiple established positions in society
(2010:118). This could easily be filtered into Merton’s framework, with social roles as simply
one of many institutionalized means, the lack of which contributes to an individual resorting to
retreatism in the form of mental illness.
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Labeling (Societal Reaction) Theory
Unlike structural strain theory, labeling theory claims that while mental illness most
certainly represents a form of deviance, its manifestation as an identity category results from an
act of a certain type of conformity rather than non-conformity (Scheff 1961:436). “Labeling
theory is based on one key idea: people who are labeled as deviant and treated as deviant become
deviant” (Thoits 2010:120). Labeling theory operates under the premise that deviance does not
arise solely from negative individual circumstances within a grander societal structure. Rather, it
assumes that deviance is a product of interaction between society and the individual in which
society determines the individual’s deviant identity and the individual conforms. Labeling theory
is also often referred to as “societal reaction theory” because it is not the “various causes of
primary deviance (psychological symptoms)” that concern these theorists; “what matters is how
the social group reacts to an individual’s primary deviance” (2010:120). Although many labeling
theorists emerged between the 1970s and early 1980s with various topical foci, I emphasize the
work of Thomas Scheff due to his direct application of labeling theory to mental illness.
In his 1961 paper “The Role of the Mentally Ill and the Dynamics of Mental Disorder”
and the larger work that followed, Being Mentally Ill, Scheff succinctly defines deviance as
something that “violates the assumptive world of the group” (1961:439). However, he furthers
this basic conceptualization by identifying a second kind of deviance, “the diverse kinds of
deviation for which our society provides no explicit label” (1961:439). This he calls residual
deviance. Scheff believes that most residual deviance is overlooked in a “pattern of inattention
and rationalization…called ‘denial,’” and that it is only “when (and if) the primary deviance
becomes an issue, and is not ignored or rationalized away, [that] labeling may create a social
type, a pattern of ‘symptomatic’ behavior in conformity with the stereotyped expectations of
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others” (1961:451). Towards the end of his work, Scheff concisely states what could be
considered his thesis: “when a primary deviant organizes his behavior within the framework of
mental disorder, and when his organization is validated by others, particularly ‘prestigeful’
others such as physicians, he is ‘hooked’ and will proceed on a career of chronic deviance”
(1961:450). Scheff’s application of labeling theory to mental illness is, according to Thoits,
“especially valuable because it reminds us that mental illness is, to some extent, socially created
and sustained and that there are risks to accepting psychiatrists’ judgments as invariably valid
assessments of mental disorder” (2010:123).

Critiques & Contemporary Frameworks
The original sociological approaches towards mental illness outlined above remain highly
controversial and are contested inside and outside of the field of sociology for a variety of
reasons. Among structural strain and labeling theorists themselves, there is an awareness of the
inherent limitations of a sociology of mental illness. Thoits reminds us that “no single approach
to mental illness—biological, psychological, or sociological—can completely explain its origins”
(2010:124). Even Scheff, whose work with labeling theory has often been cited as radical within
the sociological field for its staunch rejection of the “conventional medical and psychological
approaches,” warns against taking a one-dimensional approach towards mental illness within the
discipline. He states: “just as the individual system models [i.e., structural strain theory] understress social processes, the [labeling theory] model presented here probably exaggerates their
importance” (1961:438).
The dominant critique of structural strain theory as applied to mental illness is that
“structural theorists generally do not elaborate the ways in which broad social structures and
broad socioeconomic trends become actualized in the lives of specific individuals, and thus they
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do not clarify how or why macro-social trends can produce psychological distress or disorder”
(Thoits 2010:119). Although Merton clearly states that structural inequality is the driving force
that leads to the form of deviance we call “mental illness,” “Social Structure and Anomie” does
not provide more than the indication of potential causality. Merton’s structural strain theory
suggests that to curb psychosomatic symptoms, all we must do is solve the problem of social
inequity, without explaining what specific social factors lead individuals to exhibit certain
emotional deviances and not others. Merton himself admits this flaw in his theory, saying “this
statement, being brief, is also incomplete. It has not included an exhaustive treatment of the
various structural elements which predispose toward one rather than another of the alternative
responses open to individuals; it has neglected…the factors determining the specific incidence of
these responses” (Merton 1938:682).
Similar, and possibly more extensive, critiques have been made of labeling theory,
including a direct critique of Scheff’s work by one of Thoits’ first theoretical pieces, “SelfLabeling Processes in Mental Illness: The Role of Emotional Deviance.” Thoits starts the essay
by stating that her modifications to traditional labeling theory are meant to address Scheff’s
“limited scope of applicability” to modern diagnostic psychiatry (1985:221). “Because the
majority of mental health clients, both inpatient and outpatient, seek treatment voluntarily and do
not become chronically ill,” the assumption that a mentally ill identity is always externally
derived does not explain most modern diagnoses (1985:222). Thoits’ work extends this critique
into the construction of her own theoretical framework, promoting a unique sort of hybridization
of structural strain theory, labeling theory and symbolic interactionism in the vein of George
Herbert Mead. She calls this a “self-labeling theory” of mental illness that gives primacy to
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individual experience, and asserts that “social control is largely a product of self-control”
(1985:222).
Thoits believes that self-labeling with mental illness is a result of a four-factor associative
model of emotion which all individuals are taught to operate within, consisting of situational
cues, physiological sensations, expressive gestures, and cultural labels (1985:228). Within this
associative model, mental illness arises when “one…inadequately or incompletely learn[s] the
often subtle, complex associations between bodily sensations, situational cues, and emotional
labels, and, therefore, experience[s] a discrepancy between what one should feel and what one
actually feels” (1985:228). Properly learned associations are the result of a societal structure that
accomplishes three main things: it produces well socialized actors who can recognize rulebreaking or the violation of normative expectations; it establishes known categories of norms,
whose violations carry cultural labels (“we learn that there are appropriate times and places for
appropriate degrees of emotional expression”); and it motivates individual actors to conform to
these social expectations (1985:224). However, Thoits’ model, contrary to those of Merton and
Scheff, allows that conforming to social expectations does not necessarily mean acting out
emotional and behavioral norms. In the case that normative emotional expectations cannot be
met, there are further expectations that one will take on the culturally sanctioned deviant role of
“mentally ill” (1985:242). Although she maintains Merton’s view that structural strains plays a
large part in preventing individuals from aligning with society’s emotional norms, she adds that
multiple role occupancy and major role transitions may play equal roles in this prevention
(1985:229).
Along with self-labeling theory, Allan Horwitz’s 2002 work Creating Mental Illness
perhaps provides the most holistic, pragmatic, and applicable social theory of mental illness to
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date. In many ways, he yields to biomedical progress on mental illness in a way that none of the
other social theorists previously discussed have. He rationally begins his book by stating that,
just as a purely biological perspective cannot explain mental illness, “a pure constructionist
perspective has no extra-cultural criteria for developing a valid concept of mental illness and
therefore cannot judge the adequacy of any classification of mental symptoms” (2002:10). His
text contains multiple theses that mirror aspects of strain theory, labeling theory, and selflabeling theory, yet he comes across in his writing as more of a modern-day Szasz than a Merton
or a Scheff. Horwitz strategically distinguishes specific claims and functions of diagnostic
psychiatry, indicating gray areas where cultural and social influences have clearly played a role
in shaping the current system.
Before he delves into his theoretical work, he parses apart terminology that other theorists
had previously used interchangeably. Mental diseases are conditions where symptoms indicate
underlying internal dysfunctions, are distinct from other disease conditions, and have certain
universal features; mental disorders are all mental diseases as well as psychological dysfunctions
whose overt symptoms are shaped by cultural as well as natural processes; and mental illnesses
are whatever conditions a particular social group defines as such (2002:15). Horwitz’ principle
argument is that the application of the labels mental disease and mental disorder to “common
depressive, anxious and psychophysiological symptoms” is not representative of biomedical
truth, but of societal determination (2002:130). He states that “the manifestations of…[these]
symptoms change over time and across cultures, their symptoms blur indistinguishably into
different diagnostic entities, they have no distinct past history in families or distinct prognosis
among individuals, and all respond to similar types of treatments. There is little justification for
treating them as discrete and natural disease entities” (2002:130). Horwitz identifies what past
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social constructionists did not by indicating the specific social institutions that have a stake in
labeling “psychological conditions that fluctuate with social situations” as mental illness: “the
pervasiveness of disorders justifies advocacy efforts, the expansion of mental health services, the
promotion of pharmaceuticals, the legitimacy of diagnostic psychiatry, and ultimately, the reality
of these mental disorders itself” (2002:106).
Peggy Thoits and Allan Horwitz have critiqued and reenergized the sociology of mental
illness, integrating and modifying structural strain theory and labeling theory in ways that reach
beyond a generalized theory of “madness” to the current psychiatric climate. Their works are
applicable to modern diagnostic processes and criteria in a way that Merton’s structural strain
theory and Scheff’s labeling theory were not able to be. Their theoretical approaches have
evolved alongside the progression of biological research. They focus on neuroses with
biologically ambiguous origins rather than egregiously claiming, as past social constructionists
have, that all conditions labeled as “mental illness,” including serious psychosis such as
schizophrenia, are solely products of social construction. Thoits’ self-labeling theory and
Horwitz’ work will be referenced consistently throughout the proceeding chapters.
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Chapter Three

The Pathologization of Women

If enough people in a specific social category begin showing psychological symptoms, we
[should] extend the explanatory courtesy to them that we now extend to most middle-class white
men, asking: What is the matter with the category?
-Carol Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman
As discussed in the opening chapter, anxiety disorders are at epidemic rates, affecting 40
million Americans each year, and American women are 60% more likely to be a part of that 40
million by virtue of their sex (NIMH). It is my conviction as a researcher that these statistics
indicate enough people in the social categorization of “woman” being diagnosed with anxiety to
prompt critical questioning of the current categorizations and manifestations of anxiety disorders
in our society. And while the previous chapter illustrates the generally fraught history of
American psychiatry and positions it within social constructionist frameworks, the gendered
inequities in anxiety diagnoses cannot adequately be addressed without specifically chronicling
the historical psychiatric treatment of women’s mental health. Of additional and equal
importance, it is also necessary to carve out a space within existing research on the relationship
between gender and mental disorders in which I can properly situate my own.
The goal of this chapter on the pathologization of women is therefore fourfold. It will
begin with a brief history of psychiatry and psychology’s relationship with women. Within this
history, I will take a close look at hysteria, masochism and codependency among other womancentric diagnostic categories of the past, paying particular attention to the subtle ways in which
these categories may have contributed to the structure of modern-day anxiety and depressive
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disorder categorizations. This critical history will give way to a review of psychological and
psychiatric studies that have attempted to uncover both biological and psychosocial causes of
gendered disparity in anxiety disorders.
The final portion of this chapter will address previous feminist sociological research that
has examined women’s relationship to and experiences with mental illness. As of yet, no
feminist sociological research has been done on women and anxiety; therefore, most of the
studies I deal with concern depression. This was also an intentional decision on my part, made
because of the high comorbidity rates of anxiety and depression in women (NIMH). These
studies will be divided into two sections: the first providing a broad overview of existing
research, and the second focusing on studies particularly salient to my own work. Because the
literature I review for the first section varies greatly in theoretical perspective and methodology,
I have organized it around methodological themes in an effort to maintain both coherence and
inclusivity; it will begin with two theoretically-based studies, continue with qualitative research
focused on the lives of women with depression, and conclude with a unique study conducted by
a feminist biologist that provides further interdisciplinary insight.
The concluding section pays close attention to research that cites neoliberalism,
individualism and the market economy as the principal factors responsible for the gendering of
both the “social production and the social construction” of mental disorders (Walters 1993:394).
This literature applies the sociological concept of self-labeling theory in a manner similar to my
own intended application, but through the lens of neoliberalism. I will first look at a few feminist
texts outside of the mental health arena in order to provide a cursory definition of the neoliberal,
individualist and consumerist forces that encourage women to self-label in various spaces. The
bulk of the literature will then consist of feminist sociological studies that have examined how
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the psychopharmaceutical industry has grown to encourage women to self-label, or selfdiagnose, with mental disorders. These authors conclude that this industry’s effects have a
potentially causal relationship to the disparity in rates of diagnoses for numerous DSM
diagnostic categories. This research is most closely tied to the research I have conducted, and
will provide a fluid transition into the following chapter on my methodological approach.

A History of Miscategorization & Misdiagnosis
The historicization of what feminist scholars Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English
aptly term “the woman question” in American mental health practice has occurred within a large
body of literature across a variety of academic disciplines and among activist groups (1978).
This breadth of this work suggests that the marginalization of women through arbitrarily
constructed, yet societally pervasive, mental illness categories by the “experts” has not been
ignored by previous scholars (1978:7). To assist in my framing of the historical pathologization
of women, I have chosen to highlight three canonical feminist works. My choice of texts was due
primarily to the authors’ application of a feminist social constructionist lens to their
historicization. Additionally, the accessibility and widespread acknowledgement of their work
played a part in my selection. The works I have chosen are historians Ehrenreich and English’s
For Her Own Good, social psychologist Tavris’ The Mismeasure of Woman, and psychologist
Hannah Lerman’s Pigeonholing Women’s Misery: A History and Critical Analysis of the
Psychodiagnosis of Women in the Twentieth Century. I will also turn to other feminist scholars
when useful for further elaboration.
Although the pathologization of femininity surely has roots in earlier times and in
different locations, the American story in particular takes shape during the 19th century.
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Ehrenreich and English write that “in the mid- and late nineteenth century a curious epidemic
seemed to be sweeping through the middle- and upper-class female population...in the United
States;” this epidemic was “hysteria” (1978:113). Hysteria as a concept was not native to the
United States. Rather, it transcended the boundaries of nation-states and oceans before it
eventually ended up in the rhetoric of American doctors. Hysteria evolved from Grecian notions
of the “wandering womb,” the idea that all forms of mental pathology in women could be
reduced to an unsatisfied uterus that was roaming the female body in search of reproductive
satisfaction (1978).
While the idea of the “wandering womb” was not used outright as an explanation for
diagnoses of hysteria in the United States, American doctors still placed the blame on sexual
dysfunction and thought it to be inherent to all members of the female sex. According to
Ehrenreich and English, “doctors had established that women are sick, that this sickness is
innate, and stems from the very possession of a uterus and ovaries” (1978:147). The belief that
hysteria was sexually derived was evident in the disturbing procedures commonly used to treat
hysteria, such as ovary removal, clitoridectomy, and forced clitoral stimulation (Ehrenreich &
English 1978:136; Sheehan 1997:327). With the backing of well-respected psychologists such as
Freud, hysteria eventually evolved into a blanket diagnosis that was used by medical authorities
to explain every variation of female stress and suffering (Ehrenreich & English 1978:153).
However, it is worthwhile to note that this blanket diagnosis only encompassed upperclass female stress and suffering. “The theory of innate female sickness, skewed so as to account
for class differences in ability to pay for medical care, meshed conveniently with the doctors’
commercial self-interest,” helping to establish American psychiatry’s medical and economic
legitimacy alike (Ehrenreich & English 1978:127). As this legitimacy was garnered, more and
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more affluent women not only received diagnoses of hysteria but sought them. With everincreasing medical and market credentials, “the experts wooed their female constituency”
(1978:7). This mass of female psychiatric patients was well established by the time the United
States transitioned from its Great Depression-ravaged state into its post-World War II, industrial
capitalist and consumerist identity. During this time, the already pervasive symptomatology of
hysteria became conflated with the very real stresses felt by women as a result of the increasing
devaluation of their domestic roles. “Industrial capitalism freed women from the endless round
of household productive labor, and in one and the same gesture tore away the skills which had
been the source of women’s unique dignity” (1978:17).
As the field of psychiatry expanded into the publication of the first edition of the DSM in
1952, hysteria gradually ceded its role as the catch-all diagnosis for women to a host of other
woman-centric disorders. The creation of these new categories catered to the categorical
specificity preferred by psychiatry and the burgeoning pharmaceutical market. More
categorizations were needed to encompass all of the expressions of the female condition that
psychiatrists had come to consider inappropriate. In the 1960s, psychotherapists began to find
“‘rejection of femininity’ in frustrated or unhappy patients” (1978:300). ‘Masochism’ became
the new trending diagnosis for women, otherwise known as “self-defeating personality disorder.”
This new diagnosis could conveniently be applied to women who abandoned their domestic roles
for the work force or women who denied the individualist, consumerist pull of American society
and stayed put in the domestic sphere (1978:296). Whichever “nature” you denied, be it your
womanly nature or the capitalist nature of society, a diagnosis of masochism could medically
explain your resulting distress.
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Masochism, or self-defeating personality disorder, soon had spinoff diagnoses such as
“codependency disorder,” a revolutionary diagnosis that was often used to hold female victims of
domestic abuse or the wives of addicts personally accountable for staying with their spouses
(Tavris 1992). According to Tavris, “codependency was ‘based on the model of the normalcy of
men,’” viewing the masculine traits of individualism and personal detachment as the norm that
female codependents could not attain (Tavris 1992:197). It was not difficult for genuine
selflessness to be warped and labeled as codependency by psychiatrists. And amongst all of these
diagnostic categories pathologizing women’s mental experiences, there was an additional slew of
categories pathologizing their menstrual, sexual, and reproductive bodily functions (i.e.,
Vaginismus, Premenstrual Syndrome, Postpartum Depression) blurring the lines between
psychiatry and gynecology (Ehrenreich & English 1978).
In spite of the overt medicalization of women’s mental states throughout America’s
psychiatric history, the argument that the female “nature” was fundamentally flawed (an
argument that often served as the foundation of disorders like hysteria, masochism, and
codependency) was eventually abandoned:
For all their talk of data, laboratory findings, and clinical trials, [the experts] turned out
not to be scientists but apologists for the status quo...Within less than a decade, the entire
edifice of domestic ideology-- with its foundation of biological metaphors, its pillars of
Freudian dogma, its embellishments of medical paternalism-- tumbled down like an
ornate Victorian mansion in the face of a hurricane (Ehrenreich & English 1978:345).

However, while hysteria has long since been abandoned as a valid diagnostic category, its
successor- “histrionic personality disorder”- as well as self-defeating personality disorder and
dependent personality disorder (codependency), still enjoy widespread application by clinicians
(Lerman 1996:64). Until the very recent publication of the DSM-V, the three had maintained
their place in the American Psychiatric Association’s manual (APA 1994).
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For the most part, feminist efforts have not allowed diagnostic categories with blatant
gender bias to exist unquestioned. At times, as was the case for hysteria, they have succeeded in
ridding the psychiatric and psychological fields of problematic diagnostic categories all together
(Ehrenreich & English 1978). Feminist psychologists such as Marcie Kaplan have also been
internally maintaining checks on the system. In her 1983 piece “A Woman’s View of the DSMIII,” Kaplan states that “masculine-biased assumptions about what behaviors are healthy and
what behaviors are crazy are codified in diagnostic criteria; these criteria then influence
diagnosis and treatment rates and patterns” (Kaplan 1983:786). Because of activist-scholars like
Kaplan, gender-neutrality now serves as mandatory criteria for those granted the responsibility of
maintaining, editing and creating categories of mental disorders (APA 2013).

Psychological and Psychiatric Research
Even this brief historical context raises the question: how does our society neglect to
address the disproportionate rates of anxiety diagnoses between men and women when these
controversial disorders of the past were “were characterized by anxiety”? (Lerman 1996:63)
Psychologists and psychiatrists have only recently begun exploring the potential causes of
gendered disparity in anxiety diagnoses. The ensuing review of studies related to anxiety and
depression? is not exhaustive but, as far as I am aware, encompasses most of the available
methodological approaches and findings. The earliest study specifically looking at the
relationship between biological sex and anxiety was published in 1986, entitled “Sex, Sex-Role
Stereotyping and Agoraphobia.” The study was conducted collaboratively by psychologists
Dianne Chambless and Jeanne Mason and was meant to address the statistic that agoraphobia, at
the time of the study, was “four times more likely to be diagnosed in women as in men” in both
clinical and community populations (1986:231).
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The methods chosen by the researchers were meant to test the “sex-role stereotyping”
hypothesis (among other variables less relevant to the purposes of my study), which claims that
“women are taught and allowed to be fearful and to perceive themselves as incompetent and
helpless without male assistance” (1986:231). The researchers hypothesized that sex-role
stereotyping did indeed play a role in experiences of agoraphobia, and that those with the
disorder would exhibit more stereotypically feminine traits (1986:231). Questionnaires intended
to gauge participant levels of masculinity and femininity were distributed to 334 female students
and 68 male students at Temple University, all who had been previously diagnosed with
agoraphobia. The study operationalized masculinity in terms of “instrumentality” and femininity
in terms of “expressiveness” (1986:232).
Chambless and Mason found that “the absence of masculinity” was significantly related
to higher levels of psychopathology in respondents (1986:234). They concluded that “a society
that does not teach women to be instrumental, competent and assertive rather than just nurturant
and expressive, is one that breeds phobic women” (1986:234). They qualify this conclusion,
however, by stating that it is “quite possible” that lower levels of masculinity could be one of the
effects of experiencing agoraphobia rather than one of the causes of it (1986:234). This
qualification is briefly mentioned and is not elaborated upon or backed with experimental
evidence, demonstrating Chambless and Mason’s hesitancy to place responsibility for
agoraphobia on society’s definitions of womanhood. It is also notable that both of the researchers
are women; as Lerman points out, “until recently, almost all psychiatrists in the United States,
particularly those with organizational power, have been male and white” (1996:102). It is
interesting to speculate whether or not Chambless and Mason’s assertions were given more
credibility due to their positionality as women.
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The next study I have looked at on the relationship between gender and anxiety was
published twelve years after Chambless and Mason’s work, by Peter Lewinsohn and a cohort of
three additional psychologists. In the introduction of their study, entitled “Gender Differences in
Anxiety Disorders and Anxiety Symptoms in Adolescents,” the researchers rightly critique the
neglectful level of attention psychologists and psychiatrists have paid to rates of anxiety in
women as opposed to that paid to women’s rates of depression (1998:109). They build their
methodology upon the premise that, “to the extent that it is possible to identify psychosocial
factors that are associated with anxiety and with being female, such psychosocial variables might
mediate the association between gender and anxiety” (1998:109). With a sample population of
1,507 adolescents from Oregon high schools, Lewinsohn et al. administered two sets of
diagnostic interviews and questionnaires over a one year period, “assessing as many as possible
of the psychosocial variables known or hypothesized to be related to depression” (1998:110).
Examples of the ten total psychosocial variables assessed are self-esteem, emotional reliance,
and coping skills (1998:111).
After controlling for all psychosocial variables, the results of the statistical analysis
indicated that women were still vastly more likely to be diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. Yet
even though there was a statistically significant correlation between what they deemed
“pathological” expressions of the psychosocial variables and gender, Lewinsohn et al. concluded
that the fact that gender is still related to anxiety even when psychosocial variables are removed
from the analysis entirely negates the relevance of said variables (1998:113). This conclusion
seems illogical, as the idea that any person can exist outside of the domain of the psychosocial is
nonsensical. Thus, the idea of “controlling” for these variables cannot occur in the real world and
only exists within the realm of statistical manipulation. Reminiscent of Chambless and Mason’s
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conclusions, Lewinsohn et al.’s positionality within a field that sees mental disorder as an
organically derived phenomenon may have left them hesitant to conclude that psychosocial
factors play any real role in the actual development of an anxiety disorder.
Yet another twelve years later, psychologists Carmen P. McLean and Debra A. Hope
hypothesized that “socialization that encourages exposure to feared stimuli would facilitate the
emotional processing of feared stimuli;” essentially, they infer that men’s socialization processes
render them more competent in processing fear and therefore less likely to develop an anxiety
disorder (2010:495). To test this hypothesis, McLean and Hope conducted an experiment meant
to induce fear where they asked participants to approach a tarantula (2010:496). Participants
were separated into two groups: one that was told that their monitored heart rate was not related
to the amount of fear they experienced during the experiment, and one that was told their
monitored heart rate mattered and would be used to detect whether or not they were being
truthful when reporting their levels of fear (2010:496). Unsurprisingly, the results of the study
did not render statistically significant results. “Neither instrumentality nor expressivity
[masculinity and femininity notably operationalized in the same ways they were twenty-four
years prior in Chambless’ and Mason’s study] was significantly related with anticipatory or peak
anxiety ratings suggesting that gender role may be more related to fear behavior than fear
reporting” (2010:501).
In spite of the lack of evidence produced by their experiment, McLean and Hope
maintain their hypothesis that male privilege in the form of “learning to cope with anxiety in [a]
problem-focused manner may help equip males with the instrumental traits and skills that
prevent excessive fears or other anxiety disorders from developing” (2010:495). They conclude
their paper with recognition of the various limitations imposed by their experimental design, and

33

propose ideas for how future research on gendered differences in fear reporting would be best
conducted. However, it is difficult to take seriously an experiment based off of the assumption
that everyone would feel fearful when approaching a tarantula, and that those fear responses
could mimic the myriad fear-inducing stimuli that provoke anxiety disorders. When many
psychological studies have shied away from citing gender socialization as a predominant factor
in the development of anxiety disorders, it is disappointing to see psychologists who actually
support socialization theory using such an elementary research design. Additionally, I find their
rigid operationalization of masculinity and femininity to be problematic (see Sprague 2005 for
further discussion).
One year later, McLean co-authored a second study, along with authors Anu Asnaani,
Brett T. Litz, and Stefan G. Hofmann, entitled “Gender Differences in Anxiety Disorders:
Prevalence, Course of Illness, Comorbidity and Burden of Illness.” With this publication,
McLean tempers her perspective and conducts her research with an eye to both the biological
and the social. The article appears in a psychiatric, rather than a psychological, publication, and
attempts to unveil “basic etiologic mechanisms that are expressed differently due to genderspeciﬁc biological and environmental risk factors” in people with anxiety disorders (2011:1028).
The data used in the study was taken from the NIMH Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiology
Surveys (CPES), and was evaluated using the World Health Organization Composite
International Interview, “a diagnostic interview that generates DSM-IV diagnoses” (2011:1029).
The sample consisted of 9282 respondents, and represents the “largest, most ethnically
representative survey of the U.S. population to date” (2011:1033).
One of the primary conclusions drawn from the researchers’ analysis had to do with
comorbidity rates of anxiety and depression among women. They speculate that high rates of
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both anxiety and depression indicate that, “latent gender-dimorphic temperamental factors play a
key role in consequent gender differences both in anxiety and depression” (2011:1032.) “In other
words,” the researchers state, “genetic vulnerabilities gradually evolve into fully articulated traits
through complex, bidirectional interactions with environmental factors. The nature of this
genetic diathesis, including how gender affects heritability and expression, is not well
understood” (2011:1032). Here, the reliance of psychiatry on biological and genetic rhetoric is
finally made explicit. Although the researchers must clarify that no biological proof of “genetic
diathesis” has been discovered, they still choose put forth a biologically determinant, yet
subjectively attained, interpretation of their results. Rather than speculating about how gender
socialization processes might have contributed to the observed differences, they immediately
assume that genetic factors must be responsible.

Feminist Social Constructionist Research
Much like researchers in the fields of Psychiatry and Psychology, feminist sociologists
have not yet conducted research specific on women and their experience with anxiety disorders.
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, sociologists like Thoits and Horwitz have
theorized extensively about the social construction of mental illness in general, following in the
tradition of much earlier social constructionist scholars like Szasz and Foucault. Feminist
researchers have taken this theoretical framework and applied it to a group of research studies
that extensively look at women’s relationship to mental health frameworks. These studies
address a wide array of questions pertaining to women’s experience with mental disorder and
diagnosis. In recent years, particular attention has been paid to investigating women’s
predisposition to depression. Each study takes a unique methodological approach that
demonstrates innovation and diversity of perspective within the feminist sociological field. As
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was explained in the introduction to this chapter, I discuss the studies in this section thematically,
beginning with theoretically based texts, moving to qualitative studies, and ending with a
feminist biologist perspective.
The first theoretical piece I would like to address is a paper written in 1980 by Walter
Gove, a sociologist who self-identifies as a “proponent of the psychiatric perspective”
(1980:349). Gove’s clear empathy towards the psychiatric cause serves as a bridge between the
psychological and psychiatric literature just discussed and the feminist sociological literature I
am now engaging. In general, Gove has taken a unique stance for a sociologist towards mental
illness; he rejects Scheff’s (1970) labeling theory of mental illness and claims that societal
perceptions of mental illness come directly from the expression of mental illness itself, not vice
versa. However, in “Mental Illness and Psychiatric Treatment Among Women,” Gove asserts
that, in the case of women, mental illness is more likely to be socially rather than biologically
derived. After analyzing existing data about women’s relationship to psychiatry, Gove states,
“My major reason for believing that the higher rates of mental illness among women are largely
due to societal and not to biological factors is that they generally appear to be specific to
particular societies at particular times...and, more important, women have higher rates only
within specific roles” (1980:354). This work by Gove is a reminder to researchers in the fields of
psychiatry and sociology alike that, whether or not you believe that mental illness is a
biologically or socially derived phenomenon, you must recognize that psychiatry’s disreputable
history with women requires that any questionable pattern of diagnosis be thoroughly
investigated from a societal framework.
With Gove in mind, I begin my look at studies specifically regarding women’s
relationship to depression with Denise Russell’s Women, Madness, & Medicine, a feminist
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challenge to the current epistemological and empirical understandings of mental disorder.
Russell counters the biological determinism she finds present in Psychiatry with a staunch social
constructionist perspective much like that of Szasz, but with a particular focus on her conviction
that mental disorder diagnosis serves as a way of tethering women to their assigned social roles.
She discusses at length the “numerous psychological studies [that] have pointed out that what in
the West is generally regarded as the woman’s role happens to coincide with what is regarded as
mentally unhealthy” (1995:30). Additionally, she strongly asserts that the DSM-III-R (the
version of the DSM in use at the time of her publication) definition of mental disorder is
constructed in a way that intentionally pathologizes female experience (1995:30). While her
book addresses a variety of mental disorders, including schizophrenia, premenstrual syndrome,
anorexia and bulimia, and female criminality, she devotes an entire chapter to understanding
depression and analyzing shifting trends in diagnosis. She argues that a diagnosis of depression
has replaced hysteria as the “catch-all female diagnosis” when women exhibit a socially
“inappropriate level of unhappiness” (1995:51).
Russell’s goals are to “collapse the distinction between sanity and madness,” to propose a
re-conceptualization of the way we relate socially as a cure for mental distress rather than
continue to accept the “harm of chemical control” through pharmaceutical treatment, and to
encourage future researchers to “investigate a direction which undermines psychiatry’s prop to
patriarchy” (1995:162). Her text does little to collaborate or compromise with existing
psychiatric and mental health diagnostics, and the strength of the language she uses could easily
alienate researchers steeped in psychiatric and psychological theory. Therefore, the likelihood of
her work influencing existing power structures is very slim. However, influencing these
structures was probably not Russell’s intent. Like many other radical feminist scholars, it seems
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Russell desires a complete overthrow of the system rather than a reformation of the one already
in place. The strength of her convictions renders this argument very compelling and puts her in a
viable position to influence other researchers within her field.
The next theorist whom I wish to engage is Janet M. Stoppard, a feminist psychologist
and author of the article “Why New Perspectives Are Needed for Understanding Depression in
Women.” As evidenced by the frequency with which she is cited in the greater sociological and
psychological communities, Stoppard is a well-known proponent of utilizing “feminist
standpoint and social constructionist epistemological perspectives” to challenge and reconstruct
current “realist assumptions of mainstream medicine” towards depression among women
(2000:81). She critiques the positivist trajectory that clinical psychologists have taken within
mainstream research on depression, stating that the end results “serve to medicalize and
pathologize both women’s bodies and women’s experiences” rather than to empower them
(2000:79). She utilizes a Marxist feminist perspective, frequently alluding to “the gendered
division of social labour” as a key factor in the perpetuation of depressive symptoms among
women (2000:86). Her conclusion calls for more researchers to utilize qualitative rather than
quantitative methodologies when researching depression among women, stating: “qualitative
methodologies can contribute to the goal of exploring the gendered aspects of depression by
grounding knowledge in the experiences of women” (2000:86).
Stoppard uses social constructionist theory in a tangible, practical way, illustrating both
the benefits, and the potential means, of adapting social constructionist and feminist standpoint
perspectives in real world situations. She challenges researchers to embrace an interdisciplinary
model and discover “possibilities for combining [mainstream and feminist standpoint
approaches] in ways that would enrich and eventually transform each approach,” something I
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aim to do in this study (2000:87). Unlike Russell, who seeks to completely re-conceptualize
depression in a space parallel to the mainstream medical world, Stoppard suggests that
researchers could work to incorporate social constructionism and the lived experience of women
into already existing models. This suggestion has deeply influenced my methodological decision
to analyze my data qualitatively, and will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.
Seven years prior to Stoppard’s work, scholar Vivienne Walters was already seeking out
women’s lived experiences with anxiety and depression. In her study “Stress, Anxiety and
Depression: Women’s Accounts of Their Health Problems,” Walters’ objective was not to
discover whether or not women’s mental disorders were biologically or socially derived; rather,
she was interested simply in women’s personal interpretations of their mental health problems
(1993:394). Using census data from the Hamilton City Directory to obtain a random sample,
Walters interviewed 356 women about their understandings of their own experiences with stress,
anxiety, and depression. Walters identified three main themes in women’s explanation of their
own mental health problems: “the heavy workload of women, the issues of identity with which
they grappled and their social legacy” (1993:397). Additionally, she notes that women’s “mental
health problems were seldom explained with reference to a biomedical model,” indicating that
women generally believed that their problems were derived from their environment rather than
their genetics (1993:400). It is noteworthy that Walters’ sample consisted of a high percentage of
women who were both employed and married, suggesting the potential that her conclusions only
speak to the realities of women in particular classes and roles (1993:394).
Walters’ methodological approach privileges women’s narratives of their lived
experiences, a much-needed response to paternalistic psychiatric, psychological, and even
sociological research that has valued institutions over the individual in the name of science and
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objectivity. However, it would be a stretch to use the themes identified by Walter to explain a
modern women’s experience with anxiety or depression. The ever-changing structure of society
requires sociologists to continuously question the relevance of studies about the “social
production and social construction” of anything, including mental illness. In Walters’ case, the
homogeneity of her sample (predominantly white, middle-class, employed, married women) and
the time that has elapsed between publication and the present suggest that her research questions
should be revisited and reconceptualized.
A study undertaken by Black feminist scholar Tamara Beauboeuf-Lafontant revitalizes
Walters’ methods through an examination of the way intersectional identities affect depression.
Beauboeuf-Lafontant’s piece “Listening Past the Lies That Make Us Sick: A Voice-Centered
Analysis of Strength and Depression Among Black Women,” uses a methodological technique
she terms “voice-centered analysis”—essentially an alternative way of framing in-depth
interviews—to challenge the “prevailing notion of the distress [depression] as a white women’s
illness” (2008:393). Beauboeuf-Lafontant begins her piece by describing what she refers to as
“The Silencing Paradigm,” or the idea presented by numerous previous feminist scholars such as
Stoppard (2000) that depression in women is a result of gendered inequalities in society. “Most
provocatively,” Beauboeuf-Lafontant claims, “the silencing paradigm refutes the
conceptualization of depression as a unique and pathological state, as portrayed in the medical
literature, and instead depicts it as a process and a continuum with deep roots in what are largely
considered ‘normative’ conditions of femininity and representations of feminine goodness”
(2008:392). To test whether or not this same paradigm can explain Black women’s experiences
with depression, she obtained a convenience sample of 58 African-American women and
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conducted interviews about stereotypes of Black womanhood, beauty, and the experiential
realities of depression among Black women (2010:397).
Beauboeuf-Lafontant’s work indicates that Black women’s experience with depression
cannot be fully theorized within the context of the silencing paradigm. An additional “strength
discourse,” emphasizing the societal and cultural expectations of Black women to maintain
composure and remain selfless and silent in the face of adversity, must be included in an
intersectional theorization (2010:399). She concludes that, in reality, Black women most likely
experience depression at equal or higher rates as white women, but due to pressure to perform
the ‘the strong Black woman’ stereotype, seek help for mental health issues far less frequently
than their white counterparts (2010:404). Many of the stereotypical characteristics of ‘the strong
Black woman’ notably mirror the stereotypical assumptions of masculinity, which I previously
mentioned have already been correlated to lower rates of help-seeking for, or reporting of,
mental health problems.
However, the selflessness required of Black women differentiates the challenges they
face from those posed by hegemonic masculinity. In Beauboeuf-Lafontant’s words, “the
discourse of strength leaves little room for recognizing states of need and duress among Black
women because they emerge from the concerns of a ‘self’ that the discourse systematically
discounts” (2010:404). Beauboeuf-Lafontant’s work provides relevant, modern social
commentary about the ways in which different populations frame mental and emotional strain.
This study is an exemplar of intersectional feminism and serves as an important reminder to
researchers that there should be scholarship directly addressing race and class. It also highlights
the necessity of engaging in analyses of mental health paradigms that look beyond normative
assumptions of masculinity and femininity.
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Elizabeth Wilson (2008) presents an additional challenge to feminist sociological
researchers who focus on mental health. In her essay “Organic Empathy: Feminism,
Psychopharmaceuticals, and the Embodiment of Depression,” she challenges “the commonplace
feminist presumption that biology and politics are separate domains and that biology is a
supplement (a dangerous adjunct) to politics” (378). Wilson does something that, to the extent of
my knowledge, no other feminist researcher had formerly done; she actually looks at the
pharmacokinetics (the way a drug moves through the body) of antidepressants and breaks down
how drugs are ingested, metabolized, and affect the body and brain of someone suffering from
depression or a related mental disorder (2008:379). Wilson uses this analysis in an attempt to
overcome the barriers she feels past feminist researchers have constructed between the
psychological and the biological; she asserts that the power of antidepressants to thoroughly
improve someone’s cognition and emotional state is clear evidence that there is “an intimate
cohabitation of the biochemical and the psychological” (2008:386).
Wilson believes that to project a hardline political opposition to psychiatric and
pharmaceutical definitions of depression is also to project ignorance about the inextricability of
the biological from the cognitive. Although I agree that feminist scholars should be more
sympathetic to existing genetic and biological evidence, Wilson neglects to address the
subjectivity involved when constructing the symptomatology of diagnostic categories such as
depression and the troublesome history of Psychiatry. I find this to be equally as problematic as
she finds other feminist researchers’ neglect of biology. Nevertheless, this piece forces
proponents of the social constructionist model to remember that our psychosocial experiences are
also embodied experiences, to prevent us from unwittingly falling into the masculinist dualism
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inherited from Descartes. As such, we must grant consideration to biology when engaging our
social constructionist frameworks.

Psychopharmaceuticals and the Neoliberal Push to Self-Label
At the end of Wilson’s piece, she states, “interest in the vicissitudes of serotonergic
energy systems doesn’t mean compliance with the rhetoric and politics of Big Pharma”
(2008:390). In recent years, a number of studies about the pharmaceutical industry’s effects on
gendered disparity in rates of mental disorder diagnoses have emerged. Although Wilson’s work
exists tangentially to these studies (most of which use social constructionist theory to frame their
arguments), they are all united in one crucial way: they seek to critique the influence neoliberal
forces like “Big Pharma” have had on our society’s approaches to mental illness. Critiques of the
neoliberal model are becoming commonplace in sociological and feminist scholarship; feminist
anthropologist Ellen Lewin recently cited neoliberalism as “the new patriarchy” in a talk at the
2013 American Anthropological Association conference in Chicago, Illinois. Before engaging
with these studies, I would like to define neoliberalism in order to foster a better understanding
of the way these authors use this political-economic shift within their analyses.
Foucault, who has already been useful to this study in historicizing the anti-psychiatry
movement, offers a useful introduction to neoliberalism and its individualizing influence on
society in one of his famous lectures at the College de France. This particular lecture was not
made available to the public until 2001, when it was transcribed and discussed in Thomas
Lemke’s 2001 article “The Birth of Bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the College de
France on Neo-liberal Governmentality.” Lemke interprets Foucault’s definition of neoliberalism
as follows: “the neo-liberal programme seeks to create neither a disciplining nor a normalizing
society, but instead a society characterized by the fact that it cultivates and optimizes difference”
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(Lemke 2001:200). This cultivation of difference is manifested in the discrete diagnostic
categories of the DSM that have been “pigeonholing” emotional distress (Lerman 1996).
Foucault believes that an individual in a neoliberal society “becomes a behavioristically
manipulable being and the correlative of a governmentality which systematically changes the
variables of the ‘environment’ and can count on the ‘rational choice’ of individuals” (2001:200).
The authors of the articles I am about to discuss believe that the transformation of all forms of
mental distress into medicalized, and therefore marketable, disorders is one such systematic
change. They also posit that the pervasiveness of capitalism and consumerist culture requires that
all of the ‘rational choice’ individuals are able to make must occur in the marketplace.
Feminist sociology’s interrogation of the effects of neoliberalism and consumerist
ideology on the gendering of mental disorder rates began in 2004 and 2005 with Linda M.
Blum’s and Nena F. Stracuzzi’s “Gender in the Prozac Nation: Popular Discourse and Productive
Femininity,” and Ruth A. Chananie’s piece “Psychopharmaceutical Advertising Strategies:
Empowerment in a Pill?” It has continued with Jennifer Arney’s and Rose Weitz’s very recent
piece from 2012 entitled “Gendering Affective Disorders in Direct-to-Consumer
Advertisements.” Collectively, these studies looked at either mass print articles in magazines or
television advertisements in order to determine whether or not the advertising strategies
employed by psychopharmaceutical companies can be held responsible for some of the gendered
disparity in diagnosis rates for anxiety, depression, and other common mental disorders. The
results from each study were a resounding “yes.” All three studies found that direct-to-consumer
advertisements blatantly target women through their use of predominantly female actresses or
models as well as their use of covertly gendered language. They also found that not only do the
advertisements target women; they strongly encouraged viewers to self-label and self-diagnose
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(Blum & Stracuzzi 2004; Chananie 2005; Arney & Weitz 2012). Chananie states that
advertisements “accomplish medical legitimacy by describing disorders, symptoms, and side
effects using both scientific and everyday language that relies on cultural understandings of
illness in general and women’s experiences in particular” (2005:499). Blum & Stracuzzi warn
readers to be wary of the “biodeterminist model” of mental illness promoted by
psychopharmaceutical companies whose interests lie in accruing profit (2004:283).
All of these studies strongly support self-labeling theory, and can be easily
conceptualized through a Foucauldian lens, fitting into the larger feminist conversation about the
detrimental effects of neoliberalism on marginalized populations. They consider where many
definitions of mental disorders are produced and how these messages are communicated to the
masses. They have great potential to explain why women are predisposed to seek help for mental
distress and therefore receive the majority of diagnoses with mental disorders. What they do not
do, however, is measure how diffuse and internalized these messages have become. Their
findings justify correlative speculation that the high rates of women being diagnosed with mental
disorders can be attributed to psychopharmaceutical influence, but they do not show definitive
causation. They do not leave space for the inclusion of other variables that have been
systematically altered by the neoliberal system that could also be contributing to the imbalance in
diagnostic rates. My own research builds upon this body of work by filling the gaps I have
identified.
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Chapter Four

A Feminist Methodology
The development of my methodology has been anything but linear. I ultimately
constructed and submitted to The College of Wooster’s Human Subjects Review Committee
(HSRC) three different methods proposals before receiving permission to conduct the study
detailed in this chapter. Although I was frustrated by the lengthy series of rejections and
reinventions my methods went through before receiving approval, the process served as a
catalyst for my methodological creativity. It forced me to reconsider with each application
whether or not my previous ideas were truly answering my underlying research question: how
has the social construction of anxiety contributed to women’s disproportionate susceptibility to
diagnosis? Additionally, the experience provided insight into how Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs), much like Wooster’s HSRC, can perpetuate many of the same institutionalized systems
of knowledge that sociological and feminist researchers critique. Thus, while the primary
purpose of this chapter is to explicate the methods that produced the data used in my analysis, it
will also serve to document the evolution of my methodology and offer up a feminist critique of
current IRB practice.

Methodological Development and the HSRC
In my previous chapters, I discussed several informational and methodological gaps that
could be filled by a number of prospective methodological approaches, each with the potential to
produce new knowledge about women’s experience with anxiety disorders. The work of Thomas
Szasz (1967) and Janet Stoppard (2000) particularly influenced which of these directions I chose
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to take; feminist standpoint and social constructionist theory are guides that I have consistently
followed in spite of the construction and deconstruction processes my methods have undergone.
Sociologist Joey Sprague, author of Feminist Methodologies for Critical Researchers, provides a
comprehensive overview of feminist standpoint epistemology and theory that sits harmoniously
with the social constructionist theory put forward in the previous two chapters. Sprague states
that standpoint theory, much like social constructionist theory, argues that “the world, including
humanity, is socially constructed, which is not to say that it is not real, but rather that it is the
product of human activity” (2005:51). Therefore, standpoint theory asserts that “knowledge is
constructed in a specific matrix of physical location, history, culture, and interests, and that these
matrices change in configuration from one location to another” (2005:41). Sprague also includes
a discussion of the power that is naturally embedded in knowledge-producing research. Although
she acknowledges the potentially problematic authority that derives from the privilege held by
researchers, she states that this cannot prevent us from doing necessary work. As long as we live
in a society that is structured to “ensure the hegemony of the dominant,” attempting to avoid
hierarchal power structures altogether is untenable (2005:80). As addressed in Chapter One, it
has been my aim as a feminist researcher to remain mindful throughout this work of the power
and privilege I hold in relation to my research, a central praxis of feminist standpoint theory.
Sprague’s, as well as Stoppard’s, definition of feminist standpoint theory stresses that
legitimate knowledge can and should be produced from a variety of perspectives and
understandings, and that it is the researcher’s job to bring these perspectives to light in academic
and non-academic spheres. In the case of women living with anxiety disorders, there is little
literature that captures the perspectives of those who have received an actual diagnosis. Although
social constructionist theory surrounding mental disorder, as well as women’s disproportionate
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susceptibility to diagnoses of anxiety and depression, are becoming more widely recognized, the
existing literature neglects to include the lived experience of women who have been absorbed
into anxiety’s medical pathologization. The urgency with which Sprague and Stoppard ask their
readers to consider such voices as epistemologically valid sources struck me and left me certain
that an interview-based project working to capture women’s experience with anxiety disorders
would be the focus of my thesis. Sociologist Beauboeuf-Lafontant’s concept of voice-centered
analysis also served as methodological inspiration, confirming the initial inclination I had gained
from Sprague and Stoppard to conduct interview-based research. I determined that I would
conduct 10-15 in-depth interviews with women who had received a clinical diagnosis of an
anxiety disorder. The interviews would be semi-structured in format, with the primary intent
behind each question being to gain an understanding of the way each participant conceives of her
own identity before, during, and after her anxiety diagnosis. My intention was to prompt
participants to map the trajectory of their own identity formation, in relation to and outside of
their diagnosis. My research proposal confirmed that a number of close friends and family
members with anxiety diagnoses had already expressed interest in participating, and that I
intended on using snowball sampling to gather the rest of my participants. I stated that I believed
a woman’s participation in the study could produce the indirect benefit of having a non-clinical
space in which to reflect upon her experience with anxiety.
The HSRC firmly rejected this application in an email from Brian Karazsia, head of the
committee, on August 27, 2013, containing the statement:
Please know that this decision was not made lightly. Factors that went into this decision
included the very sensitive population from which you are sampling, coupled with
sensitive questions that could potentially increase symptoms of depression or anxiety of
your participants. We were also concerned that the referral to online websites for
assistance was not sufficient enough to mitigate these risks. Moreover, you are not
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trained, nor will the interviews be conducted in the context of someone who is trained, to
handle serious psychopathology.
I could not deny the validity of the HSRC’s concern that an undergraduate student would not
have enough training to handle serious psychopathology. Additionally, I realized in retrospect
that referral to counseling services, rather than to online websites, would have been a more
ethically sound way to ensure the safety and wellbeing of my participants. Yet I was taken aback
that, according to the HSRC, the 18% of the adult American population who have been
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder collectively constitute too sensitive of a population to be able
to reflect upon their experiences with anxiety in a non-clinical space (NIMH). In light of the
research that has been done exposing the fallibility of DSM diagnostic categories, the American
psychiatric system, and the influence of neoliberal forces on diagnosis and prescription rates, it
was concerning to me that the HSRC would only consider research on anxiety that would occur
within the context of these systems by individuals who have received their credentials within
them. This demonstrates how the same institutional structures that decide how and when to
diagnose also hold the power to allow or disallow research into their practices.
Anthropologist Elizabeth Chin recently published a scathing, yet important feminist
critique of IRBs, entitled “The Neoliberal Institutional Review Board, or Why Just Fixing the
Rules Won’t Help Feminist (Activist) Ethnographers.” In it, she states:
IRBs present yet another manifestation of neoliberalism in the academy whose primary
purpose is no longer to ensure ethical treatment of human subjects but rather to shrink the
vistas of legitimate research to those forms that support the tenets of neoliberalism itself:
the positivist, the quantitative, the experimental (2013:201).
By restricting research focused on women with anxiety to fields with access to psychological or
psychiatric resources, IRBs reinforce that the positivist, “empirical” knowledge of disorders
stemming from these fields hold greater legitimacy than the knowledge produced by sociologists
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and feminist scholars whose work seeks to give voice to the lived experience of their research
subjects. It also suggests that those who experience clinically diagnosable anxiety no longer hold
enough agentic power to make the informed decision to speak to a non-clinical researcher about
their experience. Their anxiety, because it is has been labeled as a “disorder,” invalidates their
consent, and may only be examined in clinical, monitored contexts. In Barbara Ehrenreich and
Deirdre English’s (1978) words, scientific authority on mental distress is relegated to the domain
of the “experts,” a domain where, as Chin states, “positivism directly delegitimizes feminist
forms of knowledge production and related activist aims” (2013:202).
Despite these challenges—ones that ultimately reach far beyond my own project—the
HSRC’s rejection of my initial proposal prompted me to critically reflect upon my research
question and to ask myself whether the interviews I had designed would have actually helped
answer it. I realized that although I am fascinated by both the social forces driving women’s high
rates of anxiety diagnosis and the way that receiving a diagnosis affects women’s identity
formation, each of these inquiries is individual, complex, and multifaceted. This realization led
me to reorient myself methodologically. I began to brainstorm new methods focused solely on
capturing women’s perspectives on the social factors that lead them to seek and/or receive
anxiety disorder diagnoses. Although I wanted to keep elements of Beauboeuf-Lafontant’s voicecentered analysis in my new methodology, I was aware that interrogating lived experience with
anxiety would not be approved by the HSRC and that anonymity would most likely be required.
Therefore, I designed a survey that would be anonymously administered, consisting of mostly
open-ended response questions that would ask participants about their exposure to, perceptions
of, and experiences with anxiety disorders. This survey received HSRC approval upon its second
submission, after I was asked to remove several questions regarding personal experience.

50

Methodology
I entitled the final survey “Exposure to and Attitudes Towards Anxiety Disorders” and
sent it to a random sampling of 250 students at the College of Wooster. The sample size was kept
relatively small in comparison to the overall College of Wooster student population of 2,116, due
to the open-ended nature of the majority of the survey questions (The College of Wooster 2014).
I estimated that my response rate would fall somewhere between 50-100 responses, and ended up
obtaining a survey sample of 69 (27.6%). According to the NIMH, the majority of adults
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder experience their first episode by age 21.5; this statistic, in
addition to the ease with which I could access a sample of college-aged students, served as my
motivation to sample from the College of Wooster student population. Potential participants
were sent a recruitment email detailing the purpose of the survey, the potential for identity
disclosure through demographic information, and a statement saying that consent to participate
was implied once the survey link was clicked. The survey consisted of 13 questions: four
gathering demographic information, six multiple-choice questions (four of which requested that
participants provide an open-ended explanation of their response), and three open-ended, short
answer questions (see Appendix A).
Aside from age, each demographic question was left open-ended in order to allow
participants to identify their sex and gender identity, racial identity, and socio-economic status in
a way that felt most comfortable to them. As Sprague states: “standardized measures of traits are
premised on the assumptions that traits are stable and can be measured out of context” (2005:87).
I understood that, even in leaving the demographic questions open-ended, I would eventually
still need to categorize responses in order to efficiently contextualize them with the rest of my
data. However, I was adamant that my survey challenge the typical census style format: one that
conveys identity markers like gender and race as fixed, static, and pre-determined (Sprague
51

2005). This chapter will conclude with a brief demographic portrait of my sample that includes
the specific wording used by each participant to identify themselves and a discussion of the way
this information will be contextualized within the following analysis chapter.
After demographics, the bulk of the survey questions centered on the two themes
identified in the title of the survey: exposure and attitude. Participants were asked if they were
aware of anxiety disorders, what had led to their awareness, and what their first exposure to
anxiety disorders looked like. They were then asked questions to gauge their basic understanding
of and general attitude towards anxiety disorders, such as how they defined anxiety disorders,
what factor or factors they thought caused them, and what they thought the most effective form
of treatment was. The last section of the survey was meant to ascertain more specific attitudes
participants held about the gender and circumstances of those with anxiety disorders. The intent
of this last set of questions was to explore what college-aged students believe leads an individual
to seek medical help for anxiety. Additionally, the questions were designed to further explore
whether students’ opinions align with Thoits’ theoretical perspective that women are more likely
to self-label with an anxiety disorder than men.
My goal with the survey was to achieve three principal objectives. Firstly, I wanted it to
serve as a continuation and, in some ways an evaluation, of the research of Blum, Stracuzzi,
Chananie, Arney and Weitz. I wanted to see if the neoliberal influence of pharmaceutical
advertisements, cited by the previously listed scholars as the driving force of gendered disparity
in mental disorder diagnoses, would also be cited by my participants as the source of their first
exposure to anxiety disorders. Furthermore, I wanted to determine whether other social factors,
such as pop culture and educational experiences, play roles similar to psychopharmaceutical
advertisements in influencing students’ perceptions of anxiety disorders. With so much recent
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research centering on psychopharmaceutical advertisements’ influence, I hypothesized that the
influence of other social factors might have been overlooked or minimized by previous research.
Lastly, I wanted to see if the gendered messages being circulated by pharmaceutical companies
and various other social forces have become diffused in our society to the point where students
accept gendered disparity as normal and expected in clinical help-seeking and actual diagnosis of
anxiety disorders. To analyze and draw themes from the data within the 69 participants’ surveys,
I did an initial read-through of the responses to each question and wrote down abstractions of the
themes I noticed. I then did two additional read-throughs and color-coded themes (such as
participants’ mentioning of personal experience with anxiety disorders or having taken a high
school course that first educated them about anxiety disorders) within the text by highlighting
key words and phrases. I created a master spreadsheet attaching the demographic information of
each participant to their use of keywords or identifiers salient to each theme, as well as
individual documents for each theme chronicling salient numbers and quotes to be used to
enhance the explication of each theme in analysis.

Demographic Snapshot
Participants ranged in age from 18-22. When asked to identify their sex and/or gender
identity, 45 (65.2%) participants identified as female, 22 (31.9%) identified as male, one
identified as both male and female, and one identified as agender. The vast majority of
participants (55, or 79.7%) identified as White or Caucasian. One participant identified as Black,
one as Asian, one as Middle Eastern, one as Jewish, one as Hispanic, two as American, two as
Multiracial, one as both Caucasian and Middle Eastern, two as both White and Hispanic, one as
both Asian and White, and one as having no racial identity. When asked to identify their socioeconomic status, most participants identified as either middle class (32, or 46.4%) or upper53

middle class (22, or 31.9%). Three participants identified as upper class, one as privileged, seven
as lower-middle class, one as lower class, one as “upwardly mobile” lower class, and one stated
“we make ends meet.”
Although Sprague does caution against using standardized measurements for identity
categories like gender, race, and socioeconomic status, I must also acknowledge the warning she
gives that “by building measures on the opinions of respondents, [feminist researchers run the
risk of] incorporating the dominant ideology as...respondents [have] internalized it” (2005:88). It
is certainly important to remain cognizant that the majority of the identifiers chosen by my
participants aligned with standardized models and, consequently, with the dominant ideology.
However, I believe that allowing participants to have agency over their own identifiers is still a
critical feminist methodological decision. The sorts of distinctions made by participants who
chose to identify their gender outside of the binary or their race as multifaceted would not be
observed under standardized surveying methods. Thus, while open-ended demographic questions
may reproduce the prevalent demographic categories, they also allow participants a more active
role in that reproduction.
The specific demarcations of gender, race, and socioeconomic status, used in the above
snapshot and taken directly from participant responses, will be maintained in the following
chapter as I contextualize the positionality of my participants within the themes that emerged
from their survey responses. Gender, while particularly important for the purposes of this study,
is not the only culturally significant identity experienced by participants. Race and
socioeconomic status also influence the way participants have been exposed to and taught about
anxiety disorders, and, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, often have disparate
implications in terms of diagnosis and experience with a whole host of mental disorders.
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Although previous research on racial and socioeconomic rates of diagnosis with anxiety
disorders is too limited for me to fully theorize the way that intersectionality interplays with
exposure to and attitudes towards anxiety disorders (nor is it the intent of my current research to
do so), recognition of the intersection of identities is critical to understanding where any set of
attitudes and beliefs originate.
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Chapter Five

Normalizing Abnormality

The results produced through the analysis of my survey data unearthed a host of new
themes and questions that have not been considered in previous literature. After completing the
previous chapters of my thesis, I began my analysis presuming that most of my participants
would have first encountered anxiety disorders through the marketing strategies of
psychopharmaceutical companies, and that because these advertisements sell prescription drugs,
participants would view anxiety disorders as solely medical phenomena. I hypothesized that the
gender bias that previous research had already confirmed existed within advertisements would
have led participants to believe that women were more biologically susceptible to experiencing
anxiety disorders; this would neatly reflect back upon the history of the pathologization of
women that I chronicled in Chapter Three.
Instead, the data generated through participant responses strongly suggests that
understandings of anxiety disorders do not stem from macro-social forces, but from micro-social
ones. It also asserts that articulating perceptions of anxiety disorders garnered through these
micro-social forces is a difficult endeavor; participants’ discussions of anxiety disorders were
fragmented, disjointed, and laced with contradictions between what they had learned and what
they had experienced. Throughout this chapter, I will address the three themes that occurred most
often in my data: exposure to anxiety disorders predominantly through interpersonal experience;
contradictory assertions about anxiety as participants defined it versus anxiety as it is developed
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and experienced; and participants’ view of masculinity as the driving force of gendered disparity
in diagnosis rates.
The first section on exposure will consider how the prevalence of stories surrounding
personal experiences and interactions contradicts previous research citing the market and the
media as the primary source of individual exposure. I will discuss this theme’s implication that
the influence neoliberalism has on participant perceptions may be more insidious than
acknowledged by previous studies. In the second section on contradiction, I will attempt to
negotiate the inconsistency of participants’ statements about the origins and underlying
implications of anxiety disorders, as well as the paradox between the assumptions of abnormality
participants attached to anxiety and the normalization of their breadth of personal experience
suggests. In the final section on masculinity, I will interrogate the suggestion made by the
majority of participants that the root of gendered disparity in diagnosis lies not in an overdiagnosis of women but in an under-diagnosis of men. I will contrast this suggestion with a
discussion of how previous theory and literature all suggest otherwise, and propose avenues for
future research on the subject.

Exposure
Personal experience was the social force overwhelmingly responsible for participants’
first exposure to anxiety disorders. I had previously inferred that, with 18% of Americans
diagnosed with some form of anxiety, sheer probability would lead some elements of personal
experience to surface within my data. Even in light of that initial inference, I had not anticipated
that the vast majority of my participants would have had some form of intimate connection to
anxiety disorders. Nor had I predicted that a substantial segment of my sample would have been
personally diagnosed. Yet the numbers speak for themselves: 51 of 69 participants (73.9%)
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indicated that either they and/or a friend or family member had been diagnosed with an anxiety
disorder. Of these 51, 17 participants (24.64%) had personally received an anxiety disorder
diagnosis, a rate that exceeds the national average by over six percentage points (NIMH). Fortynine participants (71.01%) knew either a friend or family member who had been diagnosed;
having a friend with a diagnosis was nearly twice as common as having a family member with a
diagnosis (29 versus 11 participants, respectively). Additionally notable, 46 participants
(66.67%) responded that a conversation with a close friend or family member had contributed to
their initial awareness. Attitudes towards anxiety disorders varied depending on the interpersonal
experiences they were developed through, but participant responses made it clear that these
experiences were the most formative factor in their perceptions of anxiety disorders.
Participants frequently embedded their beliefs about anxiety disorders directly into their
statements about friends and family members with diagnoses. For instance, one participant
highlighted the role she believes genetics play in the development of anxiety disorders through
this statement about her family: “Generalized Anxiety Disorders have been a part of my
knowledge for quite some time, seeing as mental illnesses along these lines are embedded in my
family’s genetics.” Another recounted her experience with an ex-boyfriend who had been
diagnosed by stating: “My ex had it and some of his symptoms were random outbursts of
violence and then panic attacks which usually resulted in him passing out due to the lack of
oxygen caused by shortness of breath.” Later on, this participant defined anxiety disorders as
“more of a chemical imbalance rather than a mental thing,” a viewpoint that supports the way
she frames her ex’s anxiety as a physiological rather than a mental ailment. A third participant
briefly relayed a close friend’s experience with anxiety with a reference to the “dysfunctionality”
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she later associates with anxiety disorders: “One of my good friends is diagnosed with anxiety,
and sometimes it’s difficult for her to function and stuff like sitting through a movie in a theatre.”
Most participants, including some that had been personally diagnosed, expressed that
having a close friend and/or family member with a diagnosis was a necessary precursor to an
individual’s decision to seek help for anxiety. Some expressed this in the context of their own
experience; one participant stated: “my friend freshman year had a severe anxiety disorder and it
made me realize that I shared all the same symptoms, did some research and realized I was
having panic attacks and that wasn’t just a normal thing.” Another wrote: “My sister was
diagnosed with depression and admitted to a psychiatric ward when I was 13. After that time I
started going to a psychologist and was diagnosed with depression and anxiety at 15.” These
statements underscore the salience of interpersonal exposure in these particular participants’
decisions to seek professional help. They also bring to light a mirroring effect in individuals’
recognition of their own anxiety, where one sees themselves in the experiences of others and
takes on similar labels in response (see Cooley 1902 for further discussion of mirroring.)
However, although a few other participants made similar personal connections, most participants
discussed the importance of friend/family influence as something generalizable that most likely
applied to all who sought treatment. One participant said that “knowing someone who has an
anxiety disorder” was important in any individual’s decision to seek treatment. Another said that
“if they don’t know anyone who has received treatment, they’re more likely to dismiss it [their
feelings of anxiety].”
In the same vein, participants also identified intervention by friends and/or family
members as a critical factor in an individual’s decision to seek help. One participant stated:
“Since one of the problems with anxiety disorder is that you often don’t recognize it, I think it
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usually takes another person to get you to seek treatment.” Others said things like “I think that a
huge factor is the concern of people close to the affected individual” and “I think surrounding
friends and family are the biggest factor. It’s hard to admit there may be a serious problem to
yourself, but if someone who you trust thinks you should seek help it sinks in more.” In total, 37
participants (53.62%) believed that conversation with, or intervention by, friends or family was
important in motivating individuals to identify anxiety issues and seek treatment.
Although participants’ privileging of interpersonal, micro-social forces does not directly
build upon the societal privileging of psychopharmaceutical companies found by other
researchers, it does enhance the arguments made by labeling and self-labeling theorists. As
previously quoted, Thoits asserts in her explication of self-labeling theory that “social control is
largely a product of self-control” (1985:222). The mirroring effect displayed through
participants’ accounts of personal experience, are stark examples of individuals policing their
own emotions and behaviors. When, as one participant aptly stated, “a person is in such distress
and does not function as society dictates they should,” a society that encourages self-labeling
says the next logical step is to seek out alternate culturally sanctioned roles (i.e., the role of the
mentally ill) (Thoits 1985:242). My data goes one step further in suggesting that the existence of
these alternate roles, particularly the role of the mentally ill, is not an option that all individuals
consider when they first recognize their emotions or behaviors as deviant. Rather, the role is
generally modeled by someone close to them before they adopt it themselves.
Individuals do not just take on these labels themselves; the emphasis participants placed
on family/friend intervention provides evidence in support of traditional labeling theory as well.
Yet while Scheff saw “prestigeful others” such as psychiatrists as responsible for labeling
individuals as emotionally deviant, my data suggests otherwise (1961:450). As mentioned
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previously, 37 participants expressed that common knowledge of anxiety disorders is widespread
enough that the average person feels capable of assessing others’ emotional state and
determining whether abnormal amounts of anxiety are present. This suggests that anxiety
disorders are no longer simply deviant but have become what Scheff calls a “social type”
(1961:451).
The importance of personal experience in transmitting information about anxiety
disorders detailed here should not be interpreted as a contradiction or invalidation of the
conclusions drawn by previous research about neoliberal influence. Perceptions have to originate
somewhere, and although it is possible for beliefs and attitudes to be generated at the microsocial level, the history of the American Psychiatric Association and the monopoly it has long
held on mental illness frameworks suggests that our understandings of anxiety disorders have
been propagated from the top down as detailed in Chapter Two. It would be impossible to track
the exact genesis of how perceptions of anxiety disorders, generated at the macro-level, became
diffuse enough within the population to the point where transmission through micro-social
interpersonal interaction was commonplace. However, some speculation on this topic can be
drawn from my data as well. In the context of my sample alone, 30 participants (43.48%)
indicated that advertisements for prescription drugs like Prozac and Sarafem had played some
role in developing their awareness of anxiety disorders. Perhaps messages dispelled through
advertisements instigate interpersonal conversation about anxiety disorders in which individuals
feel they have license to talk about anxiety as a disease, indirectly removing the blame from
society and instead promoting individual responsibility for one’s health.
Additionally, the large number of high school and college-aged students who are taught
about anxiety disorders in an educational context could be additionally reflective of interplay
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between the American education system and the American market system. Thirty-three
participants (43.84%) stated that their awareness of anxiety disorders had been at least partially
cultivated in an academic context. Eleven of these participants cited a college-level Psychology
course as the educational medium and seven mentioned a middle or high school course. Several
participants used language indicating that they were reflexive when learning about mental
illness, considering the symptomatology as it pertained to their peer groups and themselves:
We discussed anxiety disorders in my high school health and wellness class, alongside
other common high school age psychological issues like depression; I took a college
psychology class in high school where it was mentioned and I realized that I could
possibly suffer from the same disorder; I distinctly remember it being explained in a
classroom setting, sometime in middle school I believe, and thinking that it sounded like
something I imagined most people dealt with.
Curriculums, particularly in middle or high school settings, may be structured with the intent of
educating youth to become medical consumers. This in turn could influence students to self-label
with mental illnesses like anxiety disorders; self-labeling might then drive the other forms of
interpersonal interactions routinely emphasized by participants (Thoits 1985). Future research
should pursue more in-depth consideration of how these macro- and micro-social forces interact
to shape views about anxiety in a neoliberal era.

Beliefs and Contradictions
My original hypothesis that participants would ascribe to biological determinist
definitions of anxiety disorders was both affirmed and challenged throughout the responses
provided to me by participants. Although medicalized language was infused throughout my data
as predicted, participants continuously contradicted their learned perception that anxiety
disorders are biological abnormalities with stories of personal experience and statements citing
society or societal factors as the primary production site of anxiety. Biological/genetic factors
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indeed trumped social/cultural factors when participants were asked about the number one cause
of anxiety disorders. Twenty-seven participants chose to incorporate phrases like “chemical
imbalance,” “psychological malfunction of the brain,” “hormonal misfirings,” and “biogenetics
of anxiety disorders” when constructing their own definition of anxiety disorders. Physiological
symptoms were also frequently mentioned in these definitions; 20 participants referenced
somatic manifestations of anxiety such as “rapid heart rate,” “sleeplessness,” “inability to breathe
normally,” and “anxiety attacks.”
The way participants answered questions about the influence gender has on diagnosis
occasionally reflected biogenetic perspectives as well. Although the portion of my sample that
believed men and women are equally likely to be diagnosed with an anxiety disorder were in the
minority (27 participants, or 39.13%), the language used by participants to explain why they
thought both genders would experience anxiety disorders at equal rates often coincides with the
language discussed above: “just because you are male or female does not make you more likely
to be mentally unstable. It is all about genetics.” Because “men and women are very biologically
similar,” some participants whose perceptions aligned with biological determinist models
doubted that gendered disparity could exist in rates of anxiety order diagnoses. As one
participant succinctly stated: “if biological factors play a part, then anyone can be likely to get an
anxiety disorder.” Interestingly, a few participants who were already aware that women are
statistically more likely to be diagnosed with an anxiety disorder also used biological rhetoric to
explain their response: “There [are] a plethora of differences in hormones, brain chemistry, and
neural organization that contribute to women being generally more prone to anxiety than men.”
One participant even mentioned body chemistry during ovulation as a reason women experience

63

higher rates of anxiety disorder diagnoses than men, referring to the statistic as “a product of
these more vulnerable times in a woman’s life.”
Seeing biology and genetics as central to developing an anxiety disorder shows that, by
and large, participants conceptualize these disorders as medical phenomena. If participants frame
anxiety as genetically derived and physiologically manifested, then anxiety can be equated with
bodily health, relegating it to the medical realm. This perhaps indicates participants’ acceptance
of an abstraction of the “Cartesian dualism” that has been reflected in most modern medical
systems, where “medical practitioners...tend to believe that their primary medical role is to
diagnose and treat a patient’s illness by treating the body to the exclusion of the person who is
experiencing the illness” (Switankowsky 2000:567). If abnormal levels of anxiety are produced
in brains by chemicals, hormones, and genetics, it follows that they would be medically
diagnosed and medically treated. This model suits the neoliberal principle of individualism,
categorizing anxiety disorders as individual experiences caused by individual biology and
eliminating the need to ask what society might be doing to produce them. However, this is where
I reached a juncture in my analysis, and I began to notice the breadth of contradictions that came
through in participant responses.
Psychological counseling, a form of treatment that addresses the mind instead of the
body, was labeled the most effective form of treatment for anxiety disorders by 34 participants
(49.28%); a mere nine participants believed that prescription drugs were more effective. In fact,
many participants who had initially defined anxiety disorders as biological and/or genetic
phenomena strongly opposed medication. One participant who had at first insisted that “anxiety
disorders are almost purely genetic” later claimed that psychological counseling would be the
most effective form of treatment “because the cause of most disorders stems from problems that
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aren’t dealt with and buried down, then it manifests itself as anxiety.” A second participant said
they would define an anxiety disorder “how it is defined medically,” but later said that
“drugs...only suppress the issue. Counseling works to fix the causes of these disorders.” A third
participant discussed “genetic factors” in their definition of anxiety, but later argued against
prescription drugs, stating: “it is important to get to the root of the problem, rather than merely
covering up the symptoms, which is all prescription drugs are capable of doing.” This theme
challenges prior conclusions about the impact psychopharmaceutical advertisements have on
producing biological, bodily understandings of anxiety; it suggests that perhaps advertisements
make the population amenable to a medicalized response by healthcare professionals, but not
necessarily a medicated one.
Forty-four participants (63.8%) used key words or phrases connoting that anxiety
disorders are derived externally rather than internally. Words like “stress,” “pressure,” and
“triggers” appeared regularly, all three of which were generally used when discussing the
influence of outside forces, like work and school, in producing anxiety. Other phrases, like “the
root of the problem” and “past experiences,” further suggested that many participants see anxiety
disorders as incited by specific moments. One individual defined anxiety disorders as “stress that
overwhelms someone caused by a particular situation, event, [or] persons;” another said that they
“believe that there is almost always a trigger, however subtle, derived from social/past
experience.” Once again, these statements often came from the same participants who had earlier
used biogenetic language to describe anxiety disorders. Although participants did not seem to
view the presence of stress as any more inherent to individuals with anxiety disorders than those
without them, they framed stress management as a natural “capability” that those with anxiety
disorders lack. This was apparent in many of the definitions of anxiety disorders provided by
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participants, such as: “they [anxiety disorders] are a set of disorders that causes a level of worry
or panic above the typical for a stress level;” “anxiety disorders are a chronic issue of
anxiety...beyond typical periods of stress in life;” and “it would be primarily defined as a
disorder wherein an individual who is most likely hypersensitive to...stress is crippled by said
sensitivity.” The idea that anxiety disorders prevent individuals from handling “normal,” albeit
stressful, expectations also came through in the 38 times statements like “interference with daily
living” and “inability to function” appeared.
Framing anxiety disorders as an inability to deal with “normal” levels of stress was a way
that participants tried to negotiate the impasse between biological determinism and social
constructionism. The framework of “abnormality” serves as a middle ground, a sort of umbrella
under which both biological factors and deviance against socially sanctioned emotional and
behavioral norms can fit. About half of all participants (49%) used wording or phrasing
describing anxiety as an abnormality or irrationality at some point during their response.
“Abnormality” and “irrationality” are generally not defined or used in the same context;
however, I chose to meld them into one category because the way they were used by participants
was ambiguous and disjointed. While the words “normal” and “abnormal” at first seem to hold
biological implications, participants frequently paired them with statements that contradicted a
purely biological interpretation. The same can be said of participants’ use of words like
“irrational,” “excessive,” and “exaggerated.” Although these words are generally used to imply
deviance from social norms, participants used them in the same way they used “normal” and
“abnormal;” they used them to distinguish the behaviors of those with anxiety disorders from the
behaviors of everybody else, without having to do much else to articulate why these behaviors
were so different.
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The responses I included in the statistic given above were definitions of anxiety such as
“the irrational inability to calm a sense of extreme fear or nervousness;” “a profound lack of
control over the running of one’s thoughts and emotions;” and “conditions which cause people to
worry or be anxious more often than normal.” Although this set of words and responses convey
the notion that there is a “normal” amount of anxiety one should have and a “normal” way in
which to express it, they circumvent the task of deciding whether or not these norms have been
defined by biology or society. However, the language is still optimizing the validity of the
diagnosis while minimizing the validity of the “stress,” “pressure,” or “root of the problem”
discussed previously. Hence, under this framework of “abnormality,” the medicalization of
anxiety disorders appears to be just as easily rationalized as it is under a biogenetic framework.
This framework of “abnormality” presents one final contradiction in terms of participant
responses. In the previous section on exposure, I mentioned that the vast majority of participants
(73.9%) had either been personally diagnosed with an anxiety disorder or had a close friend or
family member who had been diagnosed. Yet although it was quite common for participants in
my sample to have had personal experience with anxiety disorders, nearly half of them
conceptualize these disorders as a definitive abnormality. Especially surprising were the
participants with personal diagnoses who placed their own experiences under this umbrella. One
participant who believed that he might suffer from an anxiety disorder himself later defined the
disorders as “a feeling– usually irrational or exaggerated– of overwhelming social pressure.”
Another participant who had recently determined that she suffered from anxiety attacks stated:
“Going through every day constantly worrying about things that you know are irrational is one of
the most frustrating things ever.” A third participant who had been diagnosed with what she
termed a “severe anxiety disorder” stated that “anxiety disorder is a generalized term for a
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variety of conditions in which a person worries excessively about something.” Individuals
certainly have the capability to recognize their own emotional behavior as irrational or excessive
if it greatly differs from the emotional behavior they see exhibited by others. However, when this
“irrationality” is present in the lives of 73.9% of a sample, we should begin to question how
emotional normality is being defined in the first place.

Pathologizing Masculinity?
While participants’ conceptualizations of anxiety disorders were ambiguously articulated
and often contradictory, participants’ opinions about how gender can play into diagnosis rates
clearly stemmed from beliefs about gendered social norms and expectations. Fifty-five
participants (79.71%) believed that women are more likely to seek medical and/or psychiatric
help for anxiety issues; 42 (60.87%) also believed that women are more likely to be diagnosed
with an anxiety disorder. Not only do these numbers reflect the gendered disparity in diagnosis
rates wherein women are twice as likely as men to be diagnosed with anxiety disorders (NIMH),
many of the justifications participants provided for their responses align with conclusions drawn
by previous research (Ehrenreich & English 1978; Russel 1995; Walters 1993.) A number of
participants (16, or 23.2%) talked about the pathologization and/or stigmatization of female
emotion, and the ways in which these factors encourage women to seek help for mental strain
more so than men. However, it was discussions of masculinity that emerged as the dominant
theme: 44 participants (or 63.8%) stated that stereotypes about masculinity are actually inhibiting
men from seeking help for anxiety issues. I will spend the first portion of this section
illuminating pertinent connections between previous literature and the influence some
participants believed constructions of femininity have on gendered disparity in anxiety disorder
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diagnoses. The latter half of this section will then concentrate on the dominant theme of
masculinity. Here, I will highlight how participant responses indicate a need to further
interrogate the relationship between masculinity and anxiety disorder diagnoses despite the lack
of previous evidence.
“It’s a sexist world out there, and there’s a rumor going around that we’re hysterical.”
This statement, made by a participant who believed that women are more likely than men to be
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, hearkens back to the history of hysteria and pathologization
of women documented by feminist scholars like Ehrenreich, English, Tavris and Lerman (1978;
1992; 1996). Six of the 18 participants who cited constructions of femininity as the cause of
gendered disparity in rates of diagnosis made references to this history embedded with feminist
underpinnings, such as: “I think women have a high tendency to be pathologized and be deemed
to have something inherently wrong them. So, patriarchy” and “there’s a whole culture and
history of ‘hysteria’ that leads women to being more frequently diagnosed. The cultural
assumption that women are more ‘delicate’ and ‘emotional’ also plays a part in these diagnoses.”
The language of another participant even mirrored Ehrenreich and English’s discussion of the
“experts” when he stated: “women are taught that 1) something is wrong with them and 2) that
there are professionals to whom they should submit for care/repair.”
While these responses suggest that some participants may have been educated about the
historical pathologization of women, other responses show that even participants who did not
have similarly sophisticated terminology to discuss gender differences still saw these differences
reflected in social norms and standards. One participant stated: “I think there is more pressure
placed on women to look and feel a certain way and to fit into a category than there is on men.
And women then stress to fit these social standards.” Another said they thought women were
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more likely to be diagnosed “because they are stereotypically more emotional and ‘unstable’
than the typical idea of a man.” Overall, these responses, given by about one-fourth of
participants, illustrated a belief that the “stress” and “pressures” participants thought trigger
anxiety are placed on women more than they are on men. In light of the large amount of
literature supporting this belief discussed in Chapters Two and Three, this number is strikingly
low.
A much larger number of participants felt that masculinity was responsible for any
disparity in rates of diagnosis of, and/or help-seeking for, anxiety. As earlier stated, 63.8% of
participants specifically mentioned masculinity, referring to it as a set of norms preventing men
from coming forward about their struggles with anxiety. In these descriptions, women were
portrayed as emotionally liberated while men were emotionally repressed: “Culturally it’s more
acceptable for women to acknowledge ‘weakness’ than it is for men. This makes it easier for
women to seek help than for men.” Participants saw masculinity as a construction that mandates
strength and composure, something that they did not see reflected in constructions of femininity:
“Men are expected to stoically take whatever comes their way, and there’s this silly idea that to
get help is to admit weakness. Women are not, and will probably be more honest about things
that’re going down medically or psychologically.” It is important to note that this understanding
of femininity (where “...women can be more open to the idea of talking about their problems in
an effort to fix them”) may reflect that the racial makeup of my sample was 80% white; Tamara
Beauboeuf-Lafontant’s work on the myth of the strong Black woman directly challenges the
notion that all women feel free to express emotional struggle (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2008).
Some participants went so far as to use language suggesting that the American culture of
masculinity marginalized or stigmatized men because of the way it restricts their access to
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mental health care. Participants said things along the lines of: “I think that there is a greater
social stigma upon men who seek psychiatric help as being ‘weak;’” “there is a social stigma
associated with men talking about their feelings, so they would be less likely to admit they have
a psychiatric problem and seek treatment;” and “much of Western/American society traditionally
discriminates against men who admit having weaknesses, and therefore they are less likely to
seek treatment.” One participant proposed that there are other categories of dependency that men
are forced into because of the stigmatization of admitting to mental strain: “men are less likely to
display symptoms because of cultural reasons- they are probably more likely to turn to drugs and
alcohol rather than admit they are anxious.”
This focus on the limitations of masculinity suggests a feeling among participants that
women are diagnosed at rates true to “reality,” while men are severely underdiagnosed because
of the restrictions that hegemonic masculinity places on male emotional expression. After
detailing the problematic construction and evolution of the DSM’s symptomatology of anxiety
disorders in Chapter Two and the mental pathologization women have faced throughout history
in Chapter Three, it seems unlikely that this sentiment holds greater truth than the conclusion
drawn by previous analyses that women are “pigeonholed” into the role of the mentally ill
(Lerman 1996). The only studies I cited previously that incorporated masculinity into their
discussion were psychological studies. These studies concluded that constructions of masculinity
did not oppress men but allotted them privilege that “equip[s] males with the instrumental traits
and skills that prevent excessive fears or other anxiety disorders from developing” (McLean &
Hope 2010:495). In fact, these studies claimed that women were oppressed by the absence of
masculinity, and that constructions of femininity, by “not teach[ing] women to be instrumental,
competent, and assertive” instead “breeds phobic women” (Chambless & Mason 1986:234).
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However, there is a body of scholarship on hegemonic masculinity asserting that, since
all gender constructions bind and restrict, masculinity comes with its own set of oppressions just
as femininity does. Scholars like R.W. Connell (2000) and Michael Kimmel (2008) have written
extensively about hegemonic masculinity and the power it wields in society. While it is not
within the purview of my study to provide a review of this literature, its existence alone shows
that there is a viable space in which further research on the ways masculinity may repress access
to mental health care can be conducted. Regardless of whether masculinity can be proven to
empirically influence diagnosis rates of anxiety disorders, it constitutes a large part of the way
my participants understand the intersections of gender, help-seeking, and the mental health
system. This alone brings up important questions about the relationship between gender
performance and help-seeking and the dynamism of gendered and emotional norms that should
be addressed in future research.
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Chapter Six

Movement Towards Mental Health Justice
As I conclude this complex historicization and theorization of the roots of gendered
disparity in diagnosis rates of anxiety disorders, I would like to reflect upon advice given by
sociologist C. Wright Mills in The Sociological Imagination. Mills compels the sociological
researcher to “know that many personal troubles cannot be solved merely as troubles, but must
be understood in terms of public issues—and in terms of the problems of history” (1959:12).
Mills’ piece, published in 1959, came just before feminist Carol Hanisch declared that “the
personal is political,” which eventually became a rallying slogan for second-wave feminist
activist efforts. Mills’ and Hanisch’s kindred words have inspired academics and activists alike
to step outside of the dominant neoliberal mindset and ask what role hegemonic systems of
power have in producing the troubles of ordinary individuals’ lives. This philosophy–that
personal troubles are and should be treated as social issues– has been adopted by decades of
American social justice movements, from the Civil Rights movement and the Women’s and Gay
Liberation movements of the 1960s to the modern manifestations of these movements today.
These movements have located the origins of individual struggle in the historical construction of
our social institutions; they have made gradual strides towards dismantling these institutions and
rebuilding a more equitable society.
Yet while the goal of such movements may have originally been to undo the
marginalizing effect social structures have on particular populations, they often ended up reassimilating these populations into mainstream consumerist culture. Movements often hold
society accountable just until social stigma is eased and economic opportunity is made viable; at
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this point, a fight for human rights often becomes a fight for consumer rights, and the emphasis
is once again removed from society and placed upon the individual. This is not easily identifiable
by activists positioned within a society that touts a “rhetoric of universal rights for all citizens
under neoliberalism,” where rights are inherently bound up in a pursuit that equates happiness
with wealth (Craven 2010:121). I argue that mental health activism in the United States has, in
large part, been steeped in neoliberalism, placing sole emphasis on securing individuals’ access
to the healthcare marketplace; mainstream advocacy efforts have failed to frame individual
mental health troubles “in terms of the problems of history” (Mills 1959:12). Before I flesh out
this argument in full and propose pathways to alternate models, I would like to briefly highlight
another movement that has seen a shift in focus from human rights to consumer rights for
comparison’s sake.
Although political debate about what women should or should not be able to do with their
bodies continues to rage throughout the world, the reproductive rights movement has in many
ways been a shining example of how neoliberalism often determines the direction and outcomes
of activist efforts. Feminist anthropologist Christa Craven writes about the complicated
relationship between reproductive rights activism and the neoliberal marketplace in her book
Pushing For Midwives: Homebirth Mothers and the Reproductive Rights Movement. Craven
asserts that the rhetoric of “choice” used by reproductive rights activists has held both political
and economic implications depending on its context (2010:127). Activists argue that individuals
should have the human right to make autonomous reproductive choices and the consumer right
to have access to said choices in the healthcare marketplace. However, the space in which
individuals are able to enact these rights—if and when they are secured—is, by default,
neoliberal. Rather than address the inequality perpetuated by a society that does not guarantee

74

reproductive rights and healthcare to the women constituting over 50% of its population,
individuals are satiated with a range of marketplace options (2008:121). Craven summarizes this
shift in reproductive rights activism in words that extend to a plethora of other activist
movements: “As governments have become less interested in protecting the social, political, and
economic rights of citizens, the focus for many activists has shifted to their rights as consumers
to make well-informed choices to purchase commodities and services within a free market”
(2010:132). In recent years, this shift has been recognized by many women of color activists and
has resulted in the emergence of a separate reproductive justice movement that addresses “access
to quality, noncoercive reproductive healthcare for [all] women” (2010:4). Activists like Loretta
Ross and Elena R. Gutierrez, as well as activist groups like Asian Communities for Reproductive
Justice, have pushed back against mainstream activist focus on consumer rights (i.e., the right to
purchase birth control, an abortion, etc.) and have instead prioritized universal access to all
forms of reproductive healthcare (see Ross and Guiterrez 2004, Asian Communities for
Reproductive Justice 2005).
Mental health activism is unique in that, with the exception of the anti-psychiatry
movement of the 1960s, its direction has arguably always been shaped by neoliberal institutions
simply because the institution defining mental illness is a neoliberal institution itself: the
American Psychiatric Association. Additionally, cultural acceptance of biological determinism
(as illustrated in part by my analysis) leads to a cultural understanding that mental illness is
produced within individuals and should therefore be addressed in a medical context; the rhetoric
used by advocacy organizations, much like the rhetoric used in psychopharmaceutical
advertisements, “reinforce[s] the medicalization process of...disorders as biologically based, and
manageable (or curable) within the paradigm of Western medicine” (Chananie 2005:488).

75

Because of this, mainstream advocacy organizations such as the National Alliance on Mental
Illness (NAMI) have focused their efforts on destigmatizing diagnosis and making healthcare
readily available to consumers, affirming the authority of the neoliberal institutions defining and
profiting from mental illness in the process. They demand that society provide individuals with
medicalized “choices” to ensure their mental health without demanding that society acknowledge
its role in producing their mental illness in the first place.
The emphasis that mental health activism places on the individual can be seen looking at
the mission statement of NAMI, the aforementioned advocacy organization. Their mission
statement reads:
NAMI recognizes that the key concepts of recovery, resiliency and support are essential
to improving the wellness and quality of life for all persons affected by mental illness.
NAMI will advocate at all levels to ensure that all persons affected by mental illness
receive the services that they need and deserve, in a timely fashion. Mental illnesses
should not be an obstacle to a full and meaningful life for persons who live with them
(NAMI 2012).
Here, the words “recovery” and “resiliency” indicate that NAMI is concerned with ameliorating
troubles in individual lives, not the social issues that may be causing them. Consistent use of the
word “persons” further emphasizes that the individual is the primary target of advocacy efforts.
Additionally, their focus on ensuring access to “services” shows that NAMI is compliant with
the models of diagnosis and treatment set up by the dominant institutions of mental health.
This critique is not to discount the relevance or the necessity of advocacy offered by
organizations like NAMI. When nearly 60 million Americans are diagnosed with some form of
mental illness, stigmatization should be battled and services should be guaranteed (NAMI 2014).
To do away with an organization striving to improve “the wellness and quality of life for all
persons affected by mental illness” just because it is permeated by the neoliberalism that
infiltrates all of American society would be futile. However, when two-thirds of those diagnosed
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with anxiety disorders are women, and research like my own provides evidence that anxiety is
perpetuated by social structures, a need for additional social justice activism becomes apparent.
As Tavris so aptly stated several decades ago: “if a mental disorder reliably and stereotypically
fits a narrow category of people, then we should be looking at what is wrong the conditions of
people in that category, not exclusively at their individual pathologies” (1992:186).
Established in 1909, Mental Health America (MHA) is the only grassroots mental health
advocacy organization that places social justice at the forefront of their mission. The first
statement on their list of guiding principles asserts that “mental health is a fundamental social
justice issue.” They make strides in envisioning individual troubles as issues in society (in Mills’
sense) in their second guiding principle, stating: “concern for the public’s health demands that
disparities in treatment and the disproportionality of the burden of illness be eradicated.” They
make further progress in their third, stating that they require “change that is commensurate to the
enormous magnitude of behavioral health problems in multiple aspects of our culture, our
communities, our neighborhoods and our families” (MHA 2014). MHA does not directly
challenge the institutions dictating how mental illness is defined and diagnosed; they, like
NAMI, still ascribe to medicalized mental illness models and advocate for consumer rights to
commoditized mental health care. However, by challenging disparities in diagnosis rates as well
as the magnitude of those rates, MHA does more to challenge the social forces contributing to
mental illness than any other organization I found.
Yet there is still more to be done. While research on the social construction and the
production of mental illness has been around for quite some time, it has not received the cultural
validation that research by the dominant mental health institutions has. We have not yet seen the
emergence of a mental health justice movement similar to the reproductive justice movement
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spearheaded by activists like Ross and Guiterrez. The American public still largely views mental
illness as something produced within individual bodies; social structures are rarely held
responsible for their role in producing disorders, and when they are, the demand is not that the
structures change, but that the individual changes the way they navigate these structures. Mental
illness categories and rates of diagnosis that disproportionately affect certain populations will not
go away until these demands are reversed. It is my hope that, with further research and advocacy,
social justice efforts like the MHA will someday be regarded as highly as the dominant mental
health institutions. To conclude in the words of Allen Horwitz, “ultimately [those who are
concerned with mental health] need to consider when restoring normality is best accomplished
by changing individuals and when it is best done by transforming social conditions” (2002:229).
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Appendix A
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What is your age?
What is your sex and/or gender identity?
How do you identify racially?
How would you describe your socio-economic status?
Are you aware of anxiety disorder (used here as an umbrella term covering several
variations of anxiety disorders as they are defined by the American Psychiatric
Association, such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Panic Disorder, etc.)?
 Yes
 No
6. If so, how have you become aware of it? (Check all that apply)
 I have been diagnosed
 Mentioned by a physician or other healthcare practitioner
 Reference in popular culture- tv, movies, etc.
 Discussion in a classroom setting
 Conversation with friends/family
 Prescription drug advertisements (i.e. Prozac, Sarafem, etc.)
 I know someone who has been diagnosed
 Other (please specify)
7. Building off of your response to question #6, do you remember particular details of the
moment(s) that you became aware of anxiety disorder(s)? (i.e. There is a character in one
of my favorite movies that has been diagnosed with anxiety; we talked about it in my
Abnormal Psychology class, etc.) Provide as much detail as possible.
8. In your own words, how would you define anxiety disorder(s)?
9. What do you think causes anxiety disorder(s)? Please include all factors you think play a
role, ranking their importance starting with 1 as the most important factor.
 Biological/Genetic Factors
 Social/Cultural Factors
 Other (Please specify in comment field below)
10. What do you think the most effective form of treatment for an anxiety disorder is?
 Psychological counseling
 Prescription drugs
 Don’t know
 Other (please specify)
11. Why do you think this form of treatment is most effective?
12. Do you think women or men are more likely to be diagnosed with an anxiety disorder?
 Women
 Men
 Equally Likely
13. Please explain your response.
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14. Do you think women or men are more likely to seek medical and/or psychiatric help for
anxiety issues?
 Women
 Men
 Equally Likely
15. Please explain your response.
16. What factors do you think lead individuals to seek treatment for anxiety disorders? Be as
specific as possible.
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